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Yugoslavia is a federated, multi-national state in which ties
of ethnicity exert greater hold on its people than do ties of
political loyalty to the state.
However,
Yugoslavia’s postwar
communist regime has partially succeeded in mollifying ethnic
sensitivities by not eroding their bases.
Instead, the ethnic
republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, BosniaHerzegovina, and Montenegro were created within the political
body of Yugoslavia and vast jurisdiction has been conceded to the
republics.
Yugoslav politics has been correspondingly shaped by
a delicate balance of power among the federal units, a balance in
which the ethnic factor is the primary consideration, no matter
what the issue may be.
As a result, Yugoslavia’s interethnic
balance serves to focus this study on the behavior, of ethnic
groups, and whether their political behavior parallels the
patterns of confrontation and competition which exist between
nation-states in an international balance of power system.
Yugoslav nationalities policy has been characterized by a
gradual devolution and decentralization of power from the League
of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) to the Communist parties of the
republics.
During the Croatian Crisis (1968-1971), the Croatian
party leaders led a nationalist movement which called for the
establishment of Croatia as an independent nation.
As the
ultimate arbiter in Yugoslavia, Tito was instrumental in removing
rebellious Croatian party leaders from the LCY.
During 1970s
ethnic conflict continued to be a growing problem for the LCY.
The Muslim population of Bosnia-Herzegovina was declared to be a
national group, and in the autonomous province of Kosovo,
secessionist and irredentist agitation by the predominantly
Albanian population was on the rise.
In April 1981, Kosova
exploded in violence and the province was put under a state a
martial law.
Without Tito as a unifying influence, the current
situation in Yugoslavia is indicative of LCY impotence in the
face of interethnic conflict in the post-Tito era.
Therefore, the Yugoslav republics have gained sufficient
autonomy to effect a balance of power arrangement in Yugoslav
politics, and within the context of Yugoslav Marxism,
ethnonational forces are the primary determinants of political
behavior, while economic factors are of secondary consideration.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
The Balkans have a long history of ethnic,
and nationalist strife.

In particular,

religious,

the area which after

World War I became Yugoslavia (The Union of South Slavs) has
been a historic crossroad for conquest and occupation.
Slavic tribes settled in what is now Yugoslavia during the
sixth century and ruled themselves until the Ottoman Turks
began their Balkan expansion in the twelfth century.

After

the collapse of the medieval kingdoms of Serbia, Croatia,
and Bosnia, the South Slavs were ruled variously by
Austrians, Hungarians,

Italians, and Turks.

The division between the jurisdiction of the Christian
powers and the empire of the Muslim Turks marked a major
cultural divide which reinforced the earlier cleavage
between Catholic and Orthodox South Slavs.

By the time the

South Slavs were brought into a common state in 1918, they
had become accustomed to thinking of themselves as distinct
peoples

(Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and Montenegrins).

The

additional presence of certain non-Slavic peoples
(Hungarians, Albanians, Germans, and Italians), together
with Slavic Bulgarians and Macedonians,
the picture.1

Thus,

further complicated

the nationalities problem became a
1
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burning issue for the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia and has
continued to occupy center stage for postwar Yugoslavia.
Because Yugoslavia is a new country,

ties of ethnicity

exert greater hold on its people than do ties of political
loyalty to the state.

The interwar kingdom foundered on its

misconceived denial of these differences among its Slavic
peoples— ethnic groups were treated as members of a single
Yugoslav nation.

Yugoslavia's postwar communist regime has

partially succeeded in mollifying ethnic sensitivities by
not eroding their bases.
Slovenia, Croatia,

Instead, the ethnic republics of

Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro were

created within the political body of Yugoslavia and vast
jurisdiction has been conceded to the republics.

Yugoslav

politics has been correspondingly shaped by a delicate
balance of power among the federal units, a balance in which
the ethnic factor is the primary consideration, no matter
what the issue may be.

As a result, Yugoslavia's inter

ethnic balance serves to focus this study on the behavior of
ethnic groups, and whether their political behavior
parallels the patterns of confrontation and competition
which exist between nation-states in an international
balance of power system.
In two cases— Bosnia and Voyvodina— the local
populations were so heterogeneous that the Communist party
hesitated to establish them as separate republics.
Voyvodina was therefore established as an autonomous
province, a unit that, at least initially, had less self-

4
governing power than the republics.

After some hesitation,

Bosnia was established as a republic, but its Serbs, Croats,
and ethnic Muslims

(categorized as a distinct national group

in 1968) were declared to have equal title to the republic.
In the southern part of Yugoslavia,

in a region Hitler had

granted to Albania and which various Yugoslav resistance
movements had wrenched back by force, the Yugoslav
communists established the autonomous region of KosovoMetohija.

This region is juridically a notch below

Voyvodina, and the population today is predominately
Albanian.
If the federal units were ethnically homogeneous the
political landscape would complex enough.

But, interethnic

relations are further complicated by the dispersion of
nationalities throughout the country,

(see Table 1)

For

example, 14 percent of the population of Croatia is
ethnically Serbian, and 17 percent of the population of
Macedonia is ethnically Albanian.

Serbians in Croatia and

Albanians in Macedonia have played volatile roles during the
past fifteen years,

inflaming relations among ethnic groups

and among the federal units.

Moreover, some of the

dispersed ethnic groups have played a role out of proportion
to their numbers.

The Croatian Serbs are overrepresented in

the Croatian party, police, and militia.

Serbs have also

long played a central role in the governing apparatus of
Albanian-populated Kosovo.2

TABLE 1.
Population of Yugoslavia by Republic,
Number of inhabitants
in thousands
YUGOSLAVIA

1981

Percentage of
largest nationality

22,418

Bosnia-Hercegovina
Croatia
Macedonia
Montenegro
Serbia
Slovenia

4,128
4,582
1,921
585
5,673
1,887

39.5(a)
75.4
66.7
68.2
85.7
90.1

Kosovo
Voyvodina

1,595
2,029

76.9(b)
54.6(c)

a = Muslims
b = Albanians
c = Serbs

Source: Statistichki kalendar Jugoslavije 1 9 8 2 ,
(Belgrade:Savezni zavod za statistiku, 1982), p. 33.
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Despite its federal form, the Yugoslav political system
was initially a tightly centralized Stalinist model.

At the

Sixth Party Congress in 1952, the Communist Party of
Yugoslavia (CPY) assumed its new name, the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia

(LCY).

The new name was a tacit

admission of the non-unitarian characteristics of
Yugoslavia's ethnic makeup, and the LCY tentatively began a
process of decentralization which has so far proven
distinctive among communist systems.-^

Since

decentralization, the republics and autonomous provinces
have increasingly become spokesmen for their titular
nationalities

(except in the cases of Bosnia, Voyvodina, and

perhaps, Kosovo).
The interrepublican struggles, which have become the
cornerstone of Yugoslav politics, have been played out on
four levels: among the republics themselves in areas where
republics, have exclusive jurisdiction; within the arena of
the federal center

(government and party) on issues in which

the jurisdiction of the center is pivotal; between groups of
republics with the federal center taking one side in the
struggle; and among various factions within the republics,
with a faction from one republic allying with a kindred
group in another republic to defeat legislation proposed by
its antagonists.

Major policy departures, such as the

legitimation of a separate Muslim nationality in 1968, have
always required the sanction of the center and, often, the
initiative of factions at the center.^

Unlike the Soviet Union, a federation dominated by the
Great Russian majority, power in Yugoslavia is somewhat
evenly dispersed along ethnic lines.

Since Serbians

comprise 40 percent of the population (see Table 2), most
alliances between republics are anti-Serbian and tend to be
sensitive to real or imagined Serbian cultural and political
hegemony.

In a country with six republics,

two semi-

autonomous provinces within the Serbian republic
and Kosovo), twenty four subnationalities,

(Voyvodina

four major

languages, and three major religions, fear of possible
Serbian chauvinism is a consistent feature of Yugoslav
politics.
President Josip Broz Tito ruled Yugoslavia for more
than thirty-five years.

His death in May 1980 was perceived

by most Yugoslavs as the end of an era.

Some observers

believed his death would catalyze revolt throughout the
country and mark the end of Yugoslavia as such.

Although

the transition to post-Tito Yugoslavia has not been without
controversy,

the succession has been accomplished with less

conflict than was once thought possible.
The 1974 Constitution is Tito's solution for succession
and LCY infighting.

He adopted the Swiss model of a

collegial presidency and hoped a rotating collective
leadership would keep Yugoslavia stable and integrated.
However, this solution has failed to cope with the problems
of growing nationalism and party decentralization.

The new

Yugoslav constitution granted greater sovereignty to the

TABLE 2.
Population of Yugoslavia by Ethnic Group,
Number
Serbs
Croats
Muslims
Slovenes
Albanians
Macedonians
"Yugoslavs"
Montenegrins
Hungarians
Gypsies
Turks
Slovaks
Romanians
Bulgarians
Vlahs
Ruthenes
Czechs
Italians
Ukrainians
Undeclared

8,136,578
4,428,135
2,000,034
1,753,605
1,731,252
1,341,420
1,216,463
577,298
426,865
148,604
101,328
80,300
54,721
‘ 36,642
32,071
23,320
19,609
15,116
12,809
46,716

TOTAL

22,418,331

1981
Percent

Source: Statistichki kalendar Jugoslavije 198 2,
(Belgrade:Savezni zavod za statistiku,1982), p. 37.

36
19
8
7
7
6
5
2
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

3
7
9

8
7
0
4

6
9
7
5
4
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
2

republics and, technically,
secession.^

it even granted the right of

Tito mistakenly surmised that although the

legal and economic system would be confederated to an
appreciable degree,

the centralizing forces of the LCY would

buttress the state and the regime.
The collective leadership fashioned by Tito publicly
proclaimed its determination to follow in Tito's path.

But,

the new leadership proved unable to prevent a loosening of
the Yugoslav system for two primary reasons.
Tito,

First, without

the LCY lacked an ultimate arbiter and was therefore

tangibly weaker than before.

For instance, the Croatian

republic was on the verge of secession between 1968-1971,
Tito was instrumental in removing rebellious Croatian party
leaders from the LCY.

Today, Croatia is again a hotbed of

separatism, and the Catholic Church's role has been compared
to the role of the Polish Church.

The divided party

leadership cannot assert itself because,

in many cases, the

will of the party cannot be discerned from interrepublican
conflict over ethnic questions.
Second, the explosion of violence in Kosovo in April
1981, when discontented Albanians went on a destructive
rampage and also attacked Serbs, produced a nationalist
backlash throughout Yugoslavia.

The current situation is

indicative of LCY impotence in the face of interethnic
conflict in the post-Tito era.

Although Kosovo is the

historic cradle of the Serbian nation, Albanian inmigration
over the past century has had a marked demographic effect.

The 1974 Constitution has inspired the Albanian majority to
push for republican status within Yugoslavia.

This

suggestion has met vehement resistance among Serbians within
the Serbian republic and in Kosovo.

As Albanian nationalism

collides with Serbian outrage over alleged atrocities
committed by Muslim Albanians against Orthodox Serbs, LCY
indecision has exacerbated the crisis.

While the federal

government struggles to maintain the status quo, Kosovo
province remains under a virtual state of martial law.

The

impasse in Kosovo has reopened questions about the utility
of federalism as a solution for interethnic tensions and
distrust.

Some Yugoslav academicians have suggested

Yugoslavia has the potential of becoming a second Lebanon.
Therefore, the object of this inquiry is to determine
if the LCY has lost the capacity to govern and if
Yugoslavia's present federal system is vulnerable to
dissolution, or, whether the Yugoslav republics have gained
sufficient autonomy to evolve into a new political structure
which resembles an international balance of power system.
In order to interpret contemporary politics in Yugoslavia,
Yugoslav nationalities policy

and three interethnic crises

during the period from 1968-1987 will be analyzed and
discussed.

In addition,

the insights of noted international

relations theorists (particularly the systems analyses of
Morton Kaplan)6 will be employed to demonstrate that
Yugoslavia's domestic political system has acquired many of
the features of an international balance of power system.
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In the interstate universe, according to Morton Kaplan
(author of Systems and Process in International Politics),
only the loose bipolar and balance of power systems have
actually had historical precedence.
which Kaplan mentions

The other four systems

(the tight bipolar, unit-veto,

universal, and hierarchical systems) are intended as
analytical constructs.7
But in the intrastate system,

five of the six systems

Kaplan describes have had historical referents— only the
unit-veto system has not.

Austria-Hungary

separate stamps, currency, parliaments,

(1867-1918)— with

tax collections, and

judicial, educational, and transportation systems— is
perhaps one of the clearest historical examples of a tight
bipolar system.

The Austrian and Hungarian halves of the

empire regularly clashed over questions of foreign policy
and engaged in continual rivalry within the state.

The

Soviet Union closely resembles the universal system,
described by Kaplan as a semi-unified political system under
a world government,

in which a central actor dominates

peripheral actors enrolled on a formally voluntary basis.
In the Soviet Union, the great Russians dominate a
multiethnic realm in which the non-Russian republics enjoy
the formal right of secession.

Switzerland figures as

Kaplan's hierarchical system, in which national actors
(German, French, and Italian language groups) cease to be
the primary foci of loyalty and function instead as terri
torial subdivisions or intermediate levels of organization.8
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Finally, Yugoslavia evolved gradually from a configura
tion which paralleled a loose bipolar system (1918-1965, a
system in which two antagonistic national actors are the
focus of political activity, while other national actors are
peripheral to the system)

to a balance of power system since

1965 (a system in which the relationships between actors are
characterized by shifting alliances, and where no one
national actor is indispensible to the system or can
dominate the decision-making process).
In order to apply a modified version of Kaplan's
typology to Yugoslavia, ethnic groups rather than states
will be designated as actors in the system.

In addition,

the

state, rather than a group of states, represents the
boundaries of the conceptual system.

Perhaps, the use of

bipolar and balance of power models as analytical frameworks
will help to bring into focus the patterns of Yugoslav
politics.
'It is the thesis of this study that in a federated
multi-national state governed by a Marxist-Leninist party,
the centralizing forces of the party will inevitably succumb
to the centripetal and fragmentary forces of nationalism and
interethnic conflict, unless there is one ethnic group which
comprises a substantial majority within the party and the
population.\ Therefore,

this study also intends to establish

that, within the context of Yugoslav Marxism, ethnonational
forces are the primary determinants of political behavior,
while economic factors are of secondary consideration.!

NOTES

^-Yugoslavia: A Country Study ed. Richard F. Nyrop
{Washington D. C.;U. S. Government, Department of the Army,
1982), pp. 1-28.
3Paul Shoup, Communism and the Yugoslav National
Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp.
101-43, 184-226; and Michele Lee, "Kosovo Between Yugoslavia
and Albania," New Left Review 140 (July-August 1983): 88.
3 Ibid.
4Dennison I, Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), p. 292.
^Joseph Richard Goldman, "Consociational Authoritarian
Politics and the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution: A Preliminary
Note," East European Quarterly 19 (June 1985): 241-49.
^Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 21-52.
7Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International
Politics (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 21-52.
®Ibid.
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CHAPTER II
YUGOSLAV NATIONALITIES POLICY
Ethnic Perspective and Background
Nationalism is a very real phenomenon in Yugoslavia and
animates much of social life.

Tensions have reached the

boiling point in nearly every republic in recent years.
Typically, sporting events provide a ready spark for
manifestations of ethnic hatred and Serb-Croat competitions
are frequently marred by outbursts of ethnic slurs and name
calling.

For instance, after a soccer match in the Croatian

city of Split, young Croats pushed several cars bearing
Belgrade license plates into the sea.

Since Belgrade is not

only the capital of Yugoslavia but also the capital of the
Serbian republic, the Croats assumed the cars belonged to
Se r b s .1
In Yugoslavia, not only interregional rivalry but also
regional opposition against centralized political power
tends to be expressed and mobilized in ethnic terms.
Regional leaders in Yugoslavia have frequently adopted this
tactic, even though economic and ethnic interests are not
always equally well served by the same solutions.

Regional

elites deliberately play the role of national leaders and
present issues in ethnic terms.

Croatian leaders have done

this vis-a-vis the Serbs, Kosovan-Albanian leaders vis-a-vis

14
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the Serbs, Macedonian party leaders vis-a-vis the Serbs, and
Serbian leaders vis-a-vis almost everyone else.
But, Yugoslav politics is not simply reducible
antagonisms between Serb and non-Serb.

The Serbs share many

common interests with the Montenegrins as well with the
Macedonians, and they have repeatedly courted the Bosnian
party as a natural ally.

It should be noted that

Montenegrins, Macedonians, and a third of the Bosnians share
a common religion with the Serbs— Eastern Orthodoxy.^

it

would not be accurate to leave the impression that non-Serbs
constitute a camp.

Croats have been increasingly worried

over the steady Slovene infiltration of the northwest corner
of Croatia's Istrian peninsula, along the border with
Slovenia.

This is at least in part an economic issue, but

Croatian apprehension is ethnic in source and is voiced in
ethnic terms.^
Despite the plethora of variations possible in Yugoslav
interethnic strife, the Serb-Croat rivalry remains the pivot
of ethnic competition and is viewed by both Serbs and Croats
in religious terms.

The identification of the churches with

nationalism goes back to the time of the Ottoman occupation,
when the Orthodox churches were the guardians of national
culture as well as the political viceroys.

In independent

Montenegro, which successfully resisted the Ottoman Turks
for five hundred years, the Orthodox Church arrogated the
role of protector of the nation.

At the same time, the

16
Catholic Church in Croatia, which had been absorbed into the
Habsburg empire, maintained a political role.^
In World War II, the Ustashe

(uprising) Croatian-

fascist government of Ante Pavelich found a ready ally in
the Catholic Church.

During the war, Croatian priests

played active roles in fomenting and overseeing the
slaughter of one million Serbs and thousands of Jews and
Gypsies.5

Even today, communist officials continue to

complain that Croatianess tends to be identified with
Catholicism and Serbianness with Orthodoxy.

Although

growing secularization is normally expected in a modernizing
society, Yugoslavia experienced a waxing xenophobia and a
rebirth of religious sentiment among the young in the late
1960s, especially in Croatia.5

The reassertion of religious

feelings underlines the closeness of the ethnic-religious
relationship in Yugoslav politics.
Therefore,

in mobilization systems like the Leninist

one-party systems of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union,
interregional politics, like every other political aspect,
cannot be distilled from the ethnic,
ideological milieu.

religious, and

This is especially true of interethnic

and interrepublcian relations, which are framed and
channeled by an explicit, developed nationalities policy
based on and derived from the underlying ideological
presumptions of the system.

The very federal arrangement

which permits the wide degree of autonomy enjoyed by

17
Yugoslavia's republics had first to be justified before it
could be advanced.
The Yugoslavs maintain they have a nationalities
policy.

This claim suggests they view their multiethnic

composition as potentially problematic, and political
involvement in this sphere is considered legitimate.

The

LCY also claims to have resolved the nationalities question.
This claim can be understood in either of two ways:

(1) that

nationalism, as politicized ethnicity, has been by and large
eliminated; or (2) that institutionalized patterns of
cooperation and mutual accommodation have become a stable
part of the political landscape, allowing nationalist
excesses to be contained, defused, or even bypassed.

The

first interpretation is the way in which the Yugoslav
communists themselves understood their claim until the
Eighth Congress of the LCY (1964).

Since then, however,

the

second interpretation has dominated Yugoslav thinking on the
subject.

In other words, the contemporary Yugoslav claim

amounts to the faith that under Yugoslavia's brand of
socialism, conditions are created which will make possible a
future solution for the nationalities problem.7
The admission that a solution for ethnic turmoil is
still in the future reflects the new candor and modesty
which have characterized LCY statements on the subject of
nationalism, especially since the Kosovo riots of 1981.
However, the LCY still asserts Yugoslavia is on the right
track and that it has devised a system which gives national

18
groups free rein to advance their separate interests, and
eventually draw together around a common interest.

Thus,

the Yugoslav communists believe they have constructed a
model of political organization worthy of emulation.®- It is
a bold claim, since it carries the implication that only
under some form of socialism is interethnic harmony
possible.

Marxism and the National Question
Karl Marx considered the existence of ethnically
heterogeneous communities as a question to be resolved.
That it was a question had become clear for the Habsburg
empire, which had suppressed a vigorous Hungarian revolution
in 1848-1849.

Hegel had already outlined a view of history

in which lower ethnic forms of life gave way to higher forms
and heterogeneity was expected to melt away before the
waxing Volksqeist of historical peoples.0

However,

for

Hegel this reduction in heterogeneity was limited to the
material realm, while the discrete national character and
consciousness of particular ethnic groups would remain.10
But, before Marx, few had raised ethnic heterogeneity from
the level of a policy question a posteriori to a status as a
question a p r i o r i .

Marx's formulation of the question at

once implied and required an answer, a resolution, a correct
approach.

Thus, the LCY's concern and preccupation with the

national question is in the critical tradition of Marxist
thought, and a discussion of Marxism and nationalism is

19
therefore necessary for a historical perspective on Yugoslav
nationalities policy.
Marx's approach to multinationality stemmed in part
from his dialectical view of history,

in which each

historical stage manifests internal contradictions and
tensions that are resolved at a higher stage,
propelling history forward.

thus

Marx also presumed true

conflict is economically motivated— the corollary being that
ethnic strife is a sham, a veneer behind which the
exploitative middle classes can mobilize and manipulate
their proletarian and peasant populations.
Nationalism,

rooted in ethnic prejudice and collective

consciousness based on a shared language, was linked by Marx
with the bourgeois-capitalist stage of historical
development, eventually to be transcended by the passage to
socialism.

In this view, proletarian internationalism is

not problematic but automatic, even ineluctable.

Marx's

supposition that national differences would dissolve with
modernization and political and economic unification implies
that the idea of nation is an expression or form of the
social organization of the market.

It is not necessarily

obvious that Marx drew from this the inference imputed to
him by the Soviets— nationalism and internationalism are
opposed.

Rather, Marx seems to have viewed proletarian

nationalism (or the authentic nationalism of a socialist
country) and internationalism as being in some sense
symbiotic.

Thus, Marx's insistence that workers have no

20
country was not a boast or a program.

It was a protest

against the exclusion of the proletariat from the privilege
of full membership in the nation.11

It is worth noting that

Yugoslav officialdom concurs with this interpretation of
Marx.

The LCY can insist nationality is indeed an important

factor in the consciousness of the working class, that the
working class still is national.
If the Yugoslav position seems to lead directly to
"national communism," which has until recently been treated
as a rather profligate child by Soviet Marxists,

it is

nevertheless consistent with the tradition in which Marx was
working.1^

Yet, it is clear from the Communist Manifesto

that Marx and Engels thought national consciousness and
nationalism would evaporate as a result of modernization.
This concept stems from the underlying Marxist assumption
that a change in behavior will lead to a change in mental
attitude.

Thus, the elimination of conflicts rooted in

class society will stimulate cooperation across ethnic lines
and create positive feelings among ethnic groups within the
system. J
However, it is not obvious Marx and Engels thought the
world would eventually speak only one language.

The current

universality of English, like the earlier universality of
Latin, only demonstrates that people of different states
require some common medium, and it is likely to be the
language of the dominant power.

Although Marx and Engels

welcomed the subjugation of "less civilized, unhistorical
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peoples"

(e.g., Slavs and Blacks) by the more advanced races

(e.g., Germans and Americans),

they stopped short of

explicitly advocating coercive ethnic assimilation.14
The Austrian Marxists, Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, were
the first Marxists to articulate a political program dealing
with the creation of harmony in an ethnically diverse state.
They were inspired in this endeavor by their desire to prop
up the faltering multinational Habsburg empire.

The

Austrian Marxists designed a centralist scheme with
concessions to cultural autonomy and guarantees of free use
of language.

Renner described the nation as a spiritual and

cultural community and emphasized the centrality of language ■
in the formation of group consciousness.

Bauer underlined

national character as a social bond and spoke of the nation
as a collective with a common culture and a shared destiny.
Bauer's definition not only blurred the distinction between
state and nation, citizenship and nationality, but also
implied a minimization of the importance of compact
territory.
The Austrian Marxists'

formulations were closer in

spirit to Hegelianism than, to Marxism.

Their notions of

nationalism allowed for the intrusion of the semimystic
concepts of character, culture, consciousness, spiritual
community, and destiny.

Renner and Bauer considered

nationality to be basically a matter of folk culture and
language.

Therefore, they were content to offer

reassurances of cultural autonomy, while withholding both
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administrative and political autonomy as potentially
disintegrative concessions.15
However, Lenin seemed to be less sympathetic to
nationalism than the Austrian Marxists were.

He asserted

that "both the example of all progressive mankind and the
example of the Balkans" demonstrated that the national state
is the rule and norm under capitalism.

/"The state of

diverse composition is something backward or an anomaly."
He believed that for the proletariat, national demands are
generally subordinate to the interests of the working class;
for the proletariat it is important "to insure the
development of its class."16 !
In 1913, Stalin undertook, on Lenin's request, to
produce an analysis of ethnicity as a political factor.
Stalin focused his work on a critique of the Austrian
Marxists.

He warned that exclusive stress on national

character was leading Bauer and Renner away from the real
essence of nationality, which is a complex phenomenon
emerging not only on the basis of a shared language, but
also within a compact territory and within the context of a
common economic life.
In addition, given the Marxist tenet that modernization
not only creates a world culture but also results in the
disintegration of distinct national cultures and the
evaporation of national antagonisms,
the notion of cultural autonomy,

Stalin concluded that

infused with notions of

preservation of culture, was inherently reactionary.

He not

23
only considered the concept of cultural autonomy to be
founded on a seriously flawed analysis of nationality, but
also deemed it politically nefarious.

Stalin's harsh

treatment of Soviet Georgians, his own ethnic identity,
underscored his views on nationality.

J However, Stalin was unable to trumpet centralism, since
such a policy had unmistakably failed in tsarist Russia, and
because the liberation of the proletariat could not be
allowed to restrict the self-determination of any
nationality .

Therefore,

Stalin offered as the ideal

solution a system of regional or territorial autonomy.

He

believed this solution would permit the nationalities to
enjoy their rights of self-determination and self
administration without obstructing the drawing together of
nations which is concomitant with the creation of a unified
market stimulated by modernization.1^ f

Marxism and Federalism
The adaptation of federalism to a Marxist-Leninist
system posed an ideological hurdle insofar as Marx's
writings are unmistakably hostile to federalism.

Marx and

Engels believed the interest of the proletariat would be
better served in a unitary state than in a federal system.
Marx was convinced decentralization could only serve the
interests of regional bourgeois elites.

He argued

centralization would create the preconditions for its own
transcendence— the withering away of the state.

In
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opposition to liberal democrats who were backing federation,
Marx told the Communist League in 1850 that "the workers
must use their influence not only for the one and
indivisible German republic, but for a decisive
centralization of force within it in the hand of the state
p o w e r ."1®
Lenin was originally hostile to federalism.

He

believed federalism weakened economic links and was an
unsuitable model for any state.

Stalin echoed these

sentiments in a March 1917 article entitled Against
Federalism.

Reiterating the Marxist maxims about the

preferability of centralism,

Stalin concluded that

"federalism in Russia does not and cannot solve the national
question;

... it merely confuses and complicates it with

quixotic ambitions to turn back the wheel of history."19

Up

to the very eve of the October Revolution, Lenin considered
the right of secession a sufficient guarantee for the
composite nationalities of the Russian empire.

State and

Revolution, completed shortly before the Bolsheviks came to
power,

represents a turning point in Lenin's views on

federalism.

Although he still asserted federalism was in

general "a hindrance to development," he insisted federalism
might represent "a step forward in certain special
conditions" and "among these special conditions the national
question appears prominently."^9
Although Soviet federalism was compromised by a refusal
to extend the principle to the Communist Party of the Soviet
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Union— as enshrined in a resolution of the Eighth Party
Congress (1919) that the central committees of the Ukraine,
Latvia, and Lithuania had no legitimate basis on which to
stake out autonomous realms— it nonetheless quickly became a
point of doctrine.

01

In the early years of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia
(CPY), the Soviet example was snubbed.

It was only in the

wake of the adoption of the popular front policy at the
Comintern's Seventh Congress (1935) that the CPY abandoned
its program of seeking to break up Yugoslavia into small
national states.

After the Congress,

the CPY began to move

in the direction of an endorsement of federalism.22
In conclusion,

it is evident that Soviet and Yugoslav

federalism is not congruent with classical Marxist tenets,
and is thus revisionist.

However, the CPSU and the LCY

would undoubtedly claim that objective conditions warranted
a change in approach and federalism was now historically
correct.

Development of Yugoslavia's Nationalities Policy
From the time of the CPY's founding in 1919 to the
period immediately preceding World War II, the Yugoslav
communists reexamined and altered several of their basic
premises regarding nationalities policy. This period can be
characterized

by three distinct phases:

(1) 1919-1923,

advocacy of centralism and unitarism, buttressed by the
concept of the tri-named people (Serbs, Croats, and
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Slovenes);

(2)1923-1928, internal contention between the

left and right wings of the party— with the Serbiandominated unitarist right wing opposed to the Croat and
Slovene controlled federalist left wing; and (3)1928-1934,
the Comintern phase, marked by submission to the Cominterm
dictum that Yugoslavia should be broken into separate,
homogeneous nation-states.2 ^
After the triumph of the Nazis in Germany in 1934, the
Comintern undertook a critical reappraisal of its
nationalities strategy and conceded it had erred.

As a

result of the attempt to prevent the further spread of
fascism, the CPY determined the national question could be
resolved within the framework of the Yugoslav state.

The

possibility of a Yugoslav solution necessarily entailed the
soft-pedaling of a Balkan federation of homogeneous nation
states.

However, the CPY simultaneously resolved to

establish Communist party organizations for Croatia,
Slovenia, and Montenegro, although this decision was
tempered by the continued adherence to the principle of
party centralization.

Secession was still considered a

right, but it was no longer seen as inherently progressive.
The danger was all too great that separatism might play into
the hands of the fascists.24
But, as late as the Fifth National Party Conference
(November, 1940) in the Croatian capital of Zagreb, the CPY
shrank from formal endorsement of federalism.

It was only

at its next session at Jajce25 on November 29, 1943, that
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the Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of
Yugoslavia (AVNOJ),

in which the CPY was heavily

represented, promised a federal order for postwar
Yugoslavia .^
Despite the agonizing appraisals and reappraisals which
had punctuated the CPY's torturous groping over the
nationalities question,

the party adopted a relatively bland

attitude immediately after the war.

In 1948, Tito tried to

convince a skeptical Slovenian audience the national
question had been settled to the general satisfaction of
Yugoslavia's peoples.

In the post war period, Yugoslav

communists generally assumed a new socialist nation was in*
the process of being c r e a t e d . ^

The federal system was

perceived to be an ephemeral formality and relinquished
little authority to the republics.

Yugoslavia's national

heterogeneity was the sole rationale for the establishment
of federalism, with each republic except Bosnia-Herzegovina
named after and consecrated as the official political
embodiment of a discrete national group.

The CPY believed

the process of homogenization would erode the basis for the
federal system, and in the ripeness of time, national
differences would wither away (a prerequisite for the
withering away of federalism and eventually the state).^®
During the 1950s,

"Yugoslav" was touted as an ethnic-

national classification in its own right, sometimes as a
supranational category.

This Yugoslavianism

(Juqoslovenstvo) and Brotherhood and Unity (Bratstvo i

jedinstvo) campaign reached its culmination at the Seventh
Congress of the LCY in 1958.^9

Although the new party

program denied the intention of assimilating the composite
groups into a homogeneous Yugoslav nation,

the concept of

"Yugoslav culture" endorsed by the congress implied an
expectation of homogenization.
The 1961 census introduced the category "Yugoslav" as
an ethnic alternative.

However, only 317,124 persons

declared themselves to be Yugoslavs rather than Serbs,
Croats, or any of the other traditional groups.

The Croats

and Slovenes in particular, but also the Muslims and other
nationalities, felt threatened by the specter of renewed
Serbian unitarism thought to be lurking under the robes of
ambiguous Yugoslavianism.

They countered the prevailing

view of an integral Yugoslavianism with the idea of organic
Yugoslavianism.

The emergent controversy between the two

rival interpretations remained unresolved until the Eighth
Congress of the LCY (December 1964) finally and resolutely
disavowed any assimilationist intent.
League of Communists of Croatia

A spokesman for the

(LCC) warned that the

insistence on the withering away of Yugoslavia's nation,
voiced in the wake of the Seventh Congress by advocates of
integral Yugoslavianism, reflected narrow-minded chauvinism
and creeping unitarism.

Tito condemned "the idea that the

unity of our peoples means the elimination of nationalities
and the creation of something new and artificial.

The Eighth Congress signified a turning point for
Yugoslav nationalities policy and for interrepublican
relations.

Henceforth,

it was no longer assumed

Yugoslavia's nations were in the process of disintegration
and Yugoslav socialist patriotism was clearly detached from
Yugoslavianism.

As a consequence,

the republics at last

came into their own as fully legitimate agents of popular
sovereignty, and federalism was finally completely accepted
by the LCY as genuinely appropriate.33

This change in

nationalities policy provided the preliminary impetus toward
the transformation of Yugoslavia into a system in which the
republics could advance their distinct interests in an
autonomous manner.
The Eighth Party Congress represented the first open
discussion of the nationality question in postwar
Yugoslavia.

No longer did the LCY pretend Yugoslavia's

national groups were somehow different from other national
groups either in consciousness or behavior,

Stalin's

distinction between bourgeois and socialist nations was
openly repudiated as an un-Marxist doctrinal innovation.34
The reassessment of Yugoslavianism created doubts about
the whole notion of such a self-identification.

In June

1969, the Belgrade weekly magazine, NIN, conducted a survey
asking people what they thought it meant to be a Yugoslav.
By September 1969, the resulting article was under fire for
unitarism, supra-statism, and negation of the equality of
the peoples of Yugoslavia.

In the 1971 census, only 273,177

persons declared themselves to be ethnically Yugoslav, a 14
percent decline from 1961.35

Doubts remained as to whether

this figure reflected anything more than mixed marriages or
the sentiment of unpoliticized Muslims.

Even the

supposition that there was something immanently progressive
about calling oneself a Yugoslav was questioned.

Many

Yugoslavs felt insulted if someone suggested a person was
more patriotic simply because he declared himself a
Yugoslav.3<*
However,

in the 1981 census, some 1,216,463 citizens of

Yugoslavia declared themselves Yugoslavs, a substantial
increase over the 1971 figure.37

This development led some

members of the party to applaud, but provoked doubt and
skepticism in other quarters.

Dushan Bilandzhich, a member

of the central committee of the Croatian party, assailed the
impression that Yugoslav nationality was somehow superior to
Croatian.

He argued there is no possibility of a Yugoslav

nation being formed.

Furthermore, he accused some newly

converted Yugoslavs of antifederalist motives expressed in
admiration of centralized administration.

Bilandzhich

implied the process of Yugoslavization was working
specifically against the Croats and noted the disappearance
of 30,000 Croats in Voyvodina.

He also openly discarded the

classical Marxist thesis of the withering away of
nationality under communism and argued the reasons for
affirming a Yugoslav nationality were insufficient and not
persuasive.
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Bilandzhich awakened a chorus of criticism.

His

critics were distressed by his assertion that Yugoslavianism
reflected centralist tendencies and quickly replied in kind.
They insinuated Bilandzhich's real concern was shown in his
lamentation over the decline of Croats in Voyvodina.

His

doubts about Yugoslavianism were portrayed as latent Croatian nationalism.®®
However, since the early 1970s, the LCY has given
renewed emphasis to Yugoslav socialist patriotism, with an
organic interpretation.

Yugoslav socialist patriotism lacks

the supranational, assimilationist property of the earlier
Yugoslavianism campaign, and is depicted as the
identification with, feeling for, and love of the socialist
community.

The sentiment is ordinarily construed as the

emotive bond which ties the individual to the collective.®^
However, some Yugoslav Marxists understand socialist
patriotism to involve collective affinity at two levels.
Devotion toward the narrow homeland— one's republic, and
devotion toward the wider homeland— Yugoslavia as a whole.
Wider patriotism does not exclude narrow patriotism, but
actually presumes it. Thus, ethnonationalism thrown out the
front door is quietly allowed entry through the rear.

Elements and Practices of Yugoslav Nationalities Policy
Yugoslav nationalities policy has eight major elements.
First, the system recognizes the ethnic particularity and
full equality of all nationality groups and guarantees the
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right of cultural-linguistic self-determination.

Second,

the system is organized as a federation with extensive
decentralization and the right of political selfdetermination,

including,

in theory, the right of secession.

Third, the LCY asserts the need to equalize economic
conditions throughout the federal units and recognizes the
equal claim of all nationalities to economic resources and
standards.4®

Fourth, ethnic tensions are defused through

self-management, a grassroots system, at least in theory,
for defusing social issues at the lowest level possible.41
Fifth, religious organizations are advised to abstain from
outspoken involvement on behalf of particular nationality
groups

(though the creation of an autocephalous Macedonian

Orthodox Church in 1967 enjoyed active LCY support because
it provided an institutional symbol of Macedonian ethnicity
in the face of Bulgarian claims that Macedonians are merely
Bulgarians).

Sixth, decentralization translates interethnic

relations into interrepublican relations.

Seventh, dual

consciousness is affirmed— ethnic consciousness and Yugoslav
consciousness (Yugoslav socialist patriotism). And, eighth,
separatism and unitarism are considered two forms of the
same perilous deviation.
Contemporary Yugoslav nationalities policy combines
radical decentralization and generous guarantees to the
ethnic cultures with a negative perception of nationalism
which often finds expression in shrill denunciations of
neofascist nationalism and antisocialist chauvinism.

The
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operating assumption of Yugoslav nationalities policy is
that any exclusively nationalist sentiment is antisocialist.
Any revival of excessive ethnic pride

(such as might be

manifested in the singing of certain songs)

is by definition

anticommunist and potentially prosecessionist.

The reason

for this fear of nationalism is, at least in part, that
Yugoslavs, as Marxists, view nationalism not primarily as a
spirit with which a nation is infused (nor even perhaps as a
political doctrine extolling the nation as a supreme value
and representing it as the dominant principle of societal
organization) but as a relationship between two or more
national societies,

in which at least one society

aspires

to dominate, exploit, or despoil the other.
Thus, for Yugoslavia's Marxists, nationalism is a
social relationship in which distinct national communities
face each other with mutually exclusive demands tinged with
resentment of the unmatched gains of the other.

It is with

this view of nationalism in mind that Tihomir Vlashkalich,
president of the central committee of the League of
Communists of Serbia (LCS), told his colleagues in 1976 that
"to be a nationalist today, in conditions of national
freedom and equality, means to be against the national
freedom of others, to be against equality, and, finally, to
even be against the freedom of one's own nation, because
nationalism today can only serve interests in favor of
hegemony and exploitation, and that is certainly not the
working class.
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However,

the LCY's abhorrence of nationalism is

balanced by a scrupulous respect for the national
sensitivities,

linguistic rights, and cultural needs of all

of Yugoslavia's national groups.

Yugoslav nationalities

policy recognizes two broad categories:

(1) the nations

(narodi), consisting of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes,
Macedonians, Montenegrins, and, since 1971, Muslims; and (2)
the "protected nationalities"

(narodsnosti) consisting of

Albanians, Hungarians, Turks,

Slovaks, Bulgarians,

Romanians, Ruthenes/Ukrainians, Czechs, Gypsies, and
Italians, amounting to 2,700,000 persons or 12 percent of
the total population in 1981.43 (See Table 2)

Yugoslavia's

recent record on national rights is commendable for all
groups except Gypsies.

Only Macedonia's constitution

accords the Gypsies equal status with the other national
groups.

In all the other federal units, the Gypsies, though

guaranteed their legal rights as individuals, are treated as
outcasts and denied any collective rights.44
As an example of Yugoslav national rights policy,
Bulgarians who live in Macedonia enjoy daily broadcasts in
Bulgarian.

Several Bulgarian language publications are

available— among them, the weekly Bratsvo (now twenty years
old); Drugarcher, a magazine for youth; and M o s t , a journal
for literature, science, and culture.

Children of all

nationalities are provided the option of schooling in their
native languages through the high school or technical school
level.

Until recently, all Yugoslav pupils were obliged to

35
study a language other than their own,

The revocation of

this requirement resulted in massive loss of interest in
Serbo-Croatian among minority students.
Guarantees to minority national groups are especially
evident in the more heterogeneous autonomous provinces.

In

Kosovo, all provincial laws are published in authentic texts
in Albanian, Serbo-Croatian, and Turkish.

State organs

conduct public procedures in either Serbo-Croatian or
Albanian or, if specified by statute in a given locality,
Turkish.

in

However, official use of Albanian only dates from

the early 1970s.

In Voyvodina, provincial laws,

declarations, and proposals appear in Serbo-Croatian,
Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, and Ruthenian.

All the

republics guarantee their minority groups the right to
establish organizations,

to promote their communal

interests, and to exercise their cultural rights— as long as
the exercise of these rights does not becomes overtly
nationalist or secessionist.
Yugoslavia recognizes three official languages:
Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian.

Serbo-

Because of Croatian

sensitivity to differences of orthography, spelling, and
vocabulary, the Serbian and Croatian variants of SerboCroatian are usually both given.

They are treated as

distinct languages for legal purpose.

But, for all

practical purposes, the British and American variants of
English are more distinct than Serbian is from Croatian.
Thus, all treaties between Yugoslavia and other states are
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published in at least four languages— Serbian, Croatian,
Slovenian, and Macedonian.

All federal buildings in

Belgrade are scrupulously identified in all four languages
and the ingredients or instructions of many household
commodities are, by law, painstakingly given in the four
languages.^
The national groups are also safeguarded in other ways.
The constitution guarantees the proportional representation
of nationalities within the officer corps of the Yugoslav
National Army (JNA), although there is clearly Serbian
domination of the officer c o r p s . T h e

constitution also

makes important concessions to the national banks of the
republics.

In addition, the republics are assured

participation in international treaties affecting their
interests .^
The federal units play an important role in
nationalities policy, not only in the administration of
various cultural and educational programs, but also through
the extension of substantial subsidies to minority
institutions.

For example,

the Croatian republic increased

subsidies for its national.minorities
Croatia) by 20 percent for 1980.

(except for Serbs in

These subsidies were

earmarked for the Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Ruthene and
Ukrainian Councils,

for newspapers in those languages, and

for the support of the Italian Union and Italian-language
drama in Croatia.^®
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Yugoslav nationalities policy necessarily assumes an
economic dimension because of the Marxist tenet that
political equality is impossible without economic equality.
Given the marked disparities between the wealthier northern
republics and the poorer southern republics, the
establishment of institutional mechanisms for the channeling
of resources to the underdeveloped regions is viewed as a
political imperative.

This theme has developed a sense of

urgency since the inflammation of Albanian nationalism in
Kosovo.^

Therefore,

it is not surprising that Yugoslavia's

social plans underline the need to accelerate development in
Kosovo and the underdeveloped republics.
Thus, Yugoslav nationalities policy can be understood
as a multifaceted assault on the roots of internal discord,
and a comprehensive program of socialization to Yugoslav
i

socialist norms of brotherhood and unity.

Although Yugoslav

nationalities policy clearly tackles problems at the
economic base, this is not in itself considered sufficient
to effect the desired metamorphosis of the superstructure.50
The system has yet to snuff out all traces of neo-Hegelian
idealism.
In one of his last works, Edvard Kardelj

(the LCY's

chief theoretician), concluded that changes in group
behavior follow and often require changes in group
consciousness.

Therefore,

it is not enough to introduce

constitutional and institutional changes.

Changes must also

take place in the collective consciousness.51

In other

38
words/ the Yugoslav equivalent of the New Soviet Man must
develop before problems of an interethnic character can be
considered to have been resolved once and for all.
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CHAPTER III
THE CROATION CRISIS:

1967-1972

The Eighth Congress of the LCY, held in December 1964,
had the task of assuaging the surfacing tensions in
interrepublican relations.

The Eighth Congress was the

occasion for the first open discussion of the national
question and for a somewhat nebulously worded agreement to
undertake economic reform.

As the Congress began, Croatian

liberals immediately started to argue the case for economic
optimalization (the use of profit criteria in investment),
and questioned the lack of circumspection with which
investment resources had been funneled into the south.
Drawing on support from Slovenia and Macedonia,
achieved a partial victory at this congress.

the Croats

But, the

consensus reached was a flimsy and even superficial one.
Rival and contradictory economic orientations were
incorporated into resolutions adopted at the Eighth
Congress.
The reform and the subsequent political devolution,
which led to the present day institutional configuration of
Yugoslavia, were to a considerable extent the handiwork of
the liberals.

They had won by wrenching control of the

system from the conservatives.2

By 1972, however, the

liberals lost the reins of power to a coalition of party
centrists (Titoists).
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The liberal coalition applied pressure both through its
representatives in Belgrade and through vigorous selfassertion within the areas of its collective geographic
jurisdiction.

Between 1965 and 1966, they were able to push

reforms which dramatically reduced the prerogatives of the
federal government in the economic sector.

Federal

subsidies to industry were slashed— a clear victory for
Croatia and Slovenia and a setback for the centralists,
whose strongholds at that time were not only in Serbia but
also in Kosovo and Montenegro.

Profitability became the

chief criterion for the allocation of resources.3
The market reform of 1965 effectively ended the golden
age of political factories, and central investment planning
was abandoned.
losers.

Yet, the Serbs were not unconditional

They continued to dominate the national banks, and

the reforms were not inimical to Belgrade's larger
corporations.

Moreover,

the distinction between advocacy of

pluralist decision making through republican coalitions or
along territorial/ethnic lines was blurred by the temporary
alliance of proponents of both approaches in the fight
against unitarism.4
At the same time, concern over the slide toward
political pluralism was growing among Serbs.

The Serbs are

sensitive to accusations of Serbian hegemony and harbor
lingering resentment against the Croats for the
establishment of an independent Croatia in World War II, and
the concomitant massacres of Serbs.5

It is important to
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remember /the LCY established itself on the wreckage of the
Serbian Chetniks, who under the leadership of General Drazha
Mihailovich had waged successful and heroic warfare against
mixture of historically rooted emotions
is combined with the conviction of many Serbs that
centralism provides the greatest good for the greatest
number.^

Serbs feel they are indeed the only true

internationalists in Yugoslavia, and have been abused and
exploited by the other nationalities.8
By 1969, there were other changes in republican
orientations.

Voyvodina, which had been associated with

Croatian and Slovenian demands for further decentralization
of the economic system, began to back off.

Montenegro

steadily became more anti-Serbian, if not exactly proCroatian.

And Croatia, shorn of support to the north and

east, began actively courting Kosovo.9

Yugoslavia was

beginning to take on the characteristics of an international
balance of power system.
At the Tenth Session of the Croatian central committee
in 1969, amid criticism of Belgrade's continued unitarianism
which underestimated the seriousness of the national
question,

the Croats launched a campaign aimed at further

devolution of authority to the republics.^-8

Eventually,

the

intersection of economic grievances with the perception of
cultural threat propelled the Croatian leadership beyond the
bounds of tolerable political behavior, provoking a
systemwide crisis.
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Economic Exploitation
Despite the economic reforms, the Croats quickly became
disgruntled.

Change was too slow and not always in the

direction favored by the Croats.

They also claimed economic

resources and credits were more concentrated in Belgrade
than ever before.

In the course of September and November

of 1971, Hrvatski tjedik, the weekly newspaper of Matica
Hrvatska11 (The Croatian Cultural Society), published a
series of articles which attempted to show how Belgrade's
banks had monopolized credit in Dalmatia and squeezed out
the indigenous Croatian b a n k s . ^
By 1971, it had become impossible to divorce economics
from politics.

It seemed clear to an increasing number of

Croats that they were being exploited because they were
Croats.

The Croats noted that Generalexport, a Belgrade

company which was knee deep in the Croatian hotel industry,
was permitted to set up its own airline long before
permission for a Croatian airline was g r a n t e d . ^
was Yugoslavia's

since this

(i.e., Serbia's) second airline, the Croats

could only conclude the forces of unitarism were still
entrenched.14

More disturbing to Croats was Shime Djodan's

argument that Croatia had been forced to accept a deficit in
trade with every other republic in the Yugoslav federation,
even while netting a sizeable surplus in foreign trade.
Djodan, an economist and leading Croatian nationalist,
identified Croatia's interests with liberalism and
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associated Yugoslav conservatives with centralism (i.e.,
Serbianism).15

Perceived Cultural and Demographic Threats
Croatian nationalists who anxiously warned Croats of
impending Serbianization were convinced the threat was real.
The Serbian menace was thought to take three forms: the
Serbianization of the Croatian language, the demographic
displacement of Croats by Serbs, and the perceived Serbian
catering to Dalmatian sentiment in order to split Croatia in
two.

These three movements were read by the overwhelming

majority of Croats as symptoms of a Serbian threat.
Population movements can be explained as strictly economic
phenomena, and linguistic homogenization is a typical
epiphenomenon of modernization.

Even the stirrings of

Dalmatian ethnic self-identity might have been interpreted
as a genuine manifestation of endogenous currents.

However,

the Croatian public did not view these developments as
isolated features.

Increasingly,

the talk was of Croatia's

need to defend itself.1®
In December 1954, the cultural associations of those
federal units in which Serbo-Croatian is the lingua franca
(Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Voyvodina, Bosnia-Herzegovina)
convened to make arrangements for collaborating on the
creation of a common orthography for the entire country and
to produce a definitive Serbo-Croatian dictionary.1^

Matica

Srp sk a, the Serbian cultural organization, had succeeded in
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persuading other participants that creation of a unified
standards dictionary and orthography was in the interests of
all national groups.

When the first two volumes of this

dictionary were finally published in 1967, they inflamed the
Croatian public.

Common Croatian vocabulary and expressions

were often relegated to the status of a local dialect; the
Serbian variant was presented as the standard, the Croatian
as the deviation.1®
In reaction, the Croats set about compiling a new
Croatian dictionary and began the "purification" of the
Croatian language from Serbian infiltration.19

Ironically,

in the Dictionary of the Croatian Lanqauqe first published
in 1901 and considered authoritative in 1968, Croatian
academics conceded that Serbian roots and culture were the
source of over 90 percent of Croatian words.

Croatians were

angered by Matica Srpska's insistence that Croatian is only
a dialect of Serbian.

Serbian academicians argued the

language of Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, and Bosnian Muslims
is a single language with negligible v ariations.

But,

Croatian scholars answered this reasoning with the
observation that the Serbian position would stifle the
autonomous development of Croatian, Montenegrin, and other
languages— even Serbian.^1
From a purely linguistic point of view, Serbo-Croatian
is obviously a single language.

But this was an ethnic and

political controversy, not a linguistic or scientific one.
In autumn 1971, the publication of the new Croatian
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Orthography (Hrvatski p r av op is ) with a new dictionary of the
"purified Croatian language" precipitated Serbian
condemnations.

Serbs warned this new dictionary would

exacerbate growing ethnic tensions between Croats and Serbs,
not help heal them.22
Croatians also began to speak of a demographic threat.
Croatia's population was proportionately older than the
population of any other republic except Slovenia.

Moreover,

the large emigration of Croatian workers to Western Europe,
which had formerly been viewed as an economic opportunity,
was suddenly construed to be a Serbian plot to move younger
Croats out of their homeland.

This situation was compounded

by another variable— the increasing influx of Serbs into
Croatia.

These Serbian immigrants were believed to be

taking the places relinquished by the Croatian emigration.
Croatian nationalists entreated the LCC to prevent any more
Serbs from moving into Croatia.2"*

Simultaneously, concerned

Croats organized to "reclaim" immigrants of earlier
centuries who had been hitherto written off as Serbian.

The

immigrants were recast (as they were during World War II
under the fascist Pavelich regime) as "Orthodox Croats,"2 ^
thus confounding the traditional canon that a Croat is
Catholic and a Serb is Orthodox.
The Serbian Orthodox Church has always resented the
tenth century forcible transfer of Dalmatia from Byzantium's
jurisdiction to the authority of Rome.

As the 1970s began,

Serbian interest in Dalmatia was more openly expressed.

The
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Serbian Orthodox Church published a book entitled Serbs and
Orthodoxy in Dalmatia and Dubrovnik.

During 1971, a ring of

Serbian nationalists printed and distributed pamphlets which
called for the immediate organization of autonomous Serbian
provinces in Dalmatia and Croatia . ^

The central committee

of the LCC considered it necessary to condemn Dalmatian
autonomism as a unitarist, anti-Croatian ruse.

Thus,

Croatian nationalists had reason to believe Dalmatian
autonomism was reviving, and Serbian interference was
tangibly p r e se nt . ^
The Dalmatians continue to view themselves as distinct
from other Croats.

In most cases, this view is as harmless

as a Texan's pride in being Texan.

But, the Croatian

central committee took pains to make it absolutely clear
that no province in Croatia had any ethnic or historical
basis for seeking autonomous status.

Dalmatian autonomism

could lay no claim to any category of legitimacy, because it
was nothing less than "treason" against the Croatian
nation.^

The Croatian Reaction
Threatened, as they saw it, with the suppression of
their language, the obliteration of their people, and the
usurpation of their land, the Croats reacted aggressively.
They repudiated the antimony of nationalism and patriotism,
and challenged the socialist doctrine that Yugoslav
patriotism is immeasurably superior to ethnic nationalism.
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The Croats also began to look for institutional-legal
measures to safeguard the Croatian nation from the Serbs.
The argument made was the Croatian nation would cease to be
manipulated and exploited only if it realized its statehood,
and only complete sovereignty could guarantee
interrepublican equality.28

Otherwise, Croatia would

continue to serve as a "plaything" for other Yugoslav
actors.

In a classic expression of balance of power

thinking, one Croat even argued "Croatia must be set as the
criterion at every moment, in every undertaking.

Nothing

can be done to benefit others that would at the same time be
contrary to Croatia's interests."

The dividing line between

statehood and secession or self-interest and rejection of
fellow Yugoslavs was often fuzzy.28
Until late in 1969, the leaders of Slovenia and
Voyvodina supported the Croatian leadership's demands for
further decentralization of the banking system and reform of
the foreign currency exchange systems.28

The catch phrase

"5 to 1" began to acquire popularity among Croats as early
as 1968.

The phrase signified the widely held view that

Croatia's demands for change were always opposed by the
other five Yugoslav republics and therefore Croatia stood
alone.21
In May 1968, Stipe Shuvar, a conservative leader within
the LCC, blasted Croatian nationalism as emotional,
irrational mysticism "dragged up from the trash heap of
history"

(Trotsky's phrase).

In response, Shuvar was
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personally upbraided by friends and acquaintances for being
a "Serbophile, a Yugo-agent, and a unita ri st ."32

However,

Shuvar refused to budge and condemned the revival of
"Croatian petit bourgeois nationalism."

He asserted

Croatian nationalism was characterized by the conviction
that all of Croatia's misfortunes were caused by the
activities of the other Yugoslav nations

(especially the

Serbs); by dependence on, and willingness to serve, various
foreign imperialistic force (Orthodox Russia); by a mystic
belief in the superiority of the Croatian nation;33 and by
the tenet that Croatian nationalism can only blossom with
the carving up of Yugoslavia.
portrayal was unmistakable.

The thrust of Shuvar's
Croatian nationalism is

misguided, ethnocentric, and dangerous.3^

But Shuvar's

capacity to influence Croatian public opinion was minimal.
Many Croats, especially intellectuals and liberal party
officials
behaved with unalloyed obtuseness toward their
non-Croat colleagues, especially the Serbs.
At a
meeting of the Yugoslav council on Visual Arts,
the Croatian delegation walked out when they were
defeated by a 5-to-l vote on the issue of moving
the administrative headquarters to a different
republic capital every two years at the time of
biennial meetings.
The Croats dismissed the
arguments of their colleagues from the other
republics that biennial shifts were not only
uneconomical, but self-defeating since close
contact with foreign cultural groups and
exhibitions— one of the organization's principal
purposes— could best be handled in Belgrade where
all the embassies are located.35
Visiting academicians attending scholarly conferences
in Zagreb, the Croatian capital, were likely to find
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themselves being corrected by militant Croats for use of
Serbian words instead of Croatian.

The new Croatian

dictionary was replete with archaisms and exotic neologisms
designed to eliminate anything which might

be construed as

Serbian expression.

and writers

A meeting of teachers

a

demanded the revision of school history books, particularly
to refute overwhelming evidence of Croatian collaboration
with the Nazis.

They wanted to give greater emphasis to

specifically Croatian achievements and called for devoting
two-thirds of the time alloted to history lessons to
Croatian culture and history.36
Until the end of 1969, the Croatian party leadership
had not taken a clear stand on the nationalist revival,
primarily because neither of its two principal factions had
been able to get the upper hand.

Milosh Zhanko, a

conservative member of the party, exhorted

his colleagues to

keep the interests of the entire country uppermost in their
minds and to subordinate Croatian interests to Yugoslav
interests.

As a result, he polarized the Croatian party,

alienated most of his passive supporters, and provoked a
counterattack.3^
At the Tenth Plenum of the central committee of the LCC
(January 15-17, 1970), the president of the central
committee, Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar, led the attack on
Zhanko.

She claimed the struggle against unitarism and the

struggle against nationalism were two sides of the same
coin.

But, because of the influence of deluded unitarists
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like Zhanko, the LCC had devoted its energies exclusively to
the struggle against nationalism.

She concluded the

Croatian party organization would have to devote greater
Op
attention to combating u n i t a n s m . 0 Dabchevich-Kuchar
interpreted Zhanko's position as disloyal, and the LCC
rebuffed him for antiparty views, stripped him of his posts,
and attested that "the struggle against nationalism cannot
be waged from unitarist battlements."2^
After the Tenth Plenum, the LCC drew steadily closer to
the ideology of Matica Hrvatska and the nationalists.

An

internal alliance was being forged to replace the moribund
interrepublican alliance with Slovenia, Voyvodina, and
Macedonia.

The Tenth Plenum was a turning point in that it

was the first time a republican central committee had
rendered an assessment of problems of further policy
development (and of the state of interethnic relations)
independently of central party organs.

The LCC was coming

into its own, speaking for Croatia as a body of Croatian
politicians.40
The Croatian revival reclaimed the heroes of the past.
Croats began reexamining their history, searching for
leaders who had been swept under the carpet by the communist
regime.

Stjepan Radich, founder of the Croatian peasant

party in the interwar period,41 became overnight the most
popular politician in Croatia, with Miko Tripalo, the
secretary of the central committee in second place, and
Tito, possibly a distant third.42

Matica Hrvatska went on the offensive, bent on "deSerbianizing" the Croatian language.

In June 1971, Matica

Hrvatska organized an open meeting to discuss the Zadar
Review (Zadarska revija).

The discussion became intense and

bitter, with Matica Hrvatska complaining that the R e v i e w 1s
langauge was "impure," a concatenation created by the
contributions of a staff drawn not merely from Croatia but
from various parts of Yugoslavia.4^

Matica Hrvatska also

pressured Yugoslav Railways, objecting that its exclusive
use of the ekavian variant (Serbian) was prejudicial to the
Croatian language.

Under additional pressure from the LCC

in Zagreb, Yugoslav Railways agreed that by September 1971,
all railway notices, schedules, and forms would also be
printed in the ijekavian variant (Croatian).

Hrvatski

tjednik protested that the buses servicing the Zagreb
airport were marked "Jugoslovenski Aerotransport"
Serbian) rather than "Jugoslavenski Aerotransport"
Croatian.44

(correct
(correct

The pettiness to which such disputes can

descend was shown by the Croatian transport administration,
which issued notices that the road between the settlements
of Skrad, the "Goranka " tavern and Stubica would be closed.
The reference to the tavern was to avoid haying to name the
village where it was located— Srpske (Serbian) Moravice.4 ^
Every federal unit was struck by nationalist outbursts
in the early 1970s.

There were strong anti-Serbian feelings

among all the non-Serbian nationalities.

Nationalist

discontent was most visible in Croatia and Kosovo and
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followed in decreasing intensity by Serbia, Montenegro,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Voyvodina.
Serbian nationalism was a particular problem among the
Serbs of Croatia.

It escalated at this time as a response

to the wave of Croatian nationalism, as an adjunct of
persistent Great Serbian chauvinism centered in the Serbian
republic, and as a reflection of the traditional,
religiously derived distrust Croatia's Serbs have long felt
toward their Croatian cousins (particularly after the World
War II massacres of Serbs in Croatia).4®
Prosvjeta, the Serbian cultural society in Croatia,47
started to change its character around 1969 and became a
stronghold for Serbian nationalists and former Chetni k s.
Exploiting this institutional base, Croatia's Serbian
nationalists sought in 1970 to create a Serbian autonomous
province within Croatia and demanded a separate network of
special Serbian schools.

Some Croatian Serbs even broached

the idea of seceding from the Croatian republic and
attaching

themselves to the Serbian republic.4®

Although

nationalist sentiment was most systematically organized in
Croatia,

it is apparent that by the early 1970s, this

dangerous system-threatening sentiment had spread throughout
Yugoslavia.4^

The Croatian National Movement Accelerates
The various factions in the Yugoslav debate over the
federalization of the LCY— democratizers,

liberals,
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nationalists/ humanists, and conservatives— had their
counterparts within the LCC.

There were the liberals, such

as Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar, Miko Tripalo, and their coterie,
together with technocrats and economic reformers;

the

nationalists, such as Shime Djodan, Marko Veselica

(a

Croatian economist),5^ and the exploding membership of
Matica Hrvatska; and the group of centralist-humanists known
as the Praxis group.
the conservatives,

In addition to these three groups were

including Milosh Zhanko and Stipe Shuvar.

The nationalists had, by early 1971, found natural
ideological allies in the liberals.

When,

in February 1971,

the conservative members of the Croatian executive committee
demanded that resolute action be taken against Matica
Hrvatska and Dabchevich-Kuchar,
action.

the liberals blocked the

However, the conservative anti-nationalists scored

a victory,

in July 1971, when they succeeded in having Shime

Djodan and Marko Veselica expelled from the party as
ringleaders of ethnocentric turmoil.51

But this victory was

an isolated triumph, for the tide was turning against the
conservatives.
Membership in Matica Hrvatska soared to 41,000 members
in fifty-five branches by November 1971 (up from 2,323
members in thirty branches in November 1970).52

The

nationalists also made steady inroads among establishment
news organs.

Even V j es ni k, the Croatian party publication,

drew closer to the nationalists.

Radio-Television Zagreb

began to carry all of Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar's speeches in
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their entirety, while systematically curtailing programming
from other Yugoslav stations and information regarding other
parts of the country.53
In this politically fluid situation,

the Croatian

conservatives employed any and all available means in their
struggle for control of the Croatian party.

Ironically,

they found allies in the humanists of the Praxis group,5^
who possessed an ideologically rooted antipathy toward
decentralization, nationalism, and even federalism (which
the humanists considered a unnecessary compromise with
Marxism).55

When the Croatian district court of Sisak

banned the May-August 1971 issue of Prax is , because of an
article which contained a searing indictment of the rising
nationalist movement in Yugoslavia (particularly in Croatia)
and which linked nationalism with the efforts of an
"unproletarian"55 new middle class to consolidate its
position, the conservatives took the issue to the Croatian
Supreme Court.5^

Both sides in the contest knew exactly how

Praxis figured in the struggle:
The consistently outspoken and hostile attacks of
the Praxis collaborators on the spirit of
nationalism had made it increasingly urgent for
the nationalist ideologues to discredit Praxis in
the public eye and to impair...its further
activity.... It is unlikely, therefore, that
Praxis' strategic value in the struggle against
"nationalist deformations" went unnoticed by the
federal authorities, and it cannot be doubted that
calculations such as these played some role in the
Croatian Supreme Court's 1971 decision to overturn
the Sisak District Court's ban on the contested
issue of P r a x i s . ®
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At the same time, Tito was watching developments in
Croatia with increasing concern and, early in July 1971,
traveled to Zagreb to talk with Croatia's leadership.

Tito

revealed to them his misgivings that Croatia was sliding
back to the atmosphere of the prewar era and implied the
republican leadership was losing control of the situation.
"Are we going to have 1941 all over again?" Tito asked.
"That would be a catastrophe."6^
was the cult of Stjepan Radich.

Of special concern to Tito
"Radich's organization was

a kulak organization, he hated communists and did not
represent the interests of the working class.

We offered to

cooperate with him, but he did not want anything to do with
us," said Tito.
Clearly, Tito remained the ultimate arbiter in
interrepublican and— so it seemed— intrarepublican affairs.
When he brought the full force of pressure to bear, a
republican leadership almost always had to yield ground.
But, since Tito increasingly believed Yugoslav stability was
best guaranteed when Yugoslavia operated as a self
regulating system of broadly autonomous federal units, the
republics perceived his interventions as setting limits of
legitimate activity rather than aborting independent
decision making.61
Therefore, the response of Croatia's nationalist
communists to Tito's July lecture was not to cave in but to
conclude Tito was poorly informed and needed to be
enlightened.

The nationalists managed to ameliorate Tito's
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fears in a carefully orchestrated reception for him in
Zagreb in September 1971.
his Zagreb audience,

Tito made an about-face and told

"I have been able to convince myself

just how absurd certain stories about Croatia are— that
there is no unity here,

that people here think differently,

that chauvinism blossoms and thrives here.

None of that is

true."62
Croatian nationalism now took a dangerous turn,
riveting its attention on ethnically mixed Bosnia to the
south.

In the gathering storm, it was inevitable that

Croatian eyes should turn to Bosnia.

This territory had

been part of Croatia during the reign of fascist Ustashe
Croatia, and some twenty percent of its population consisted
of ethnic Croats.

Although today Bosnian Muslims make up a

plurality of Bosnia's population,

it should be noted that

Bosnian Serbs comprised over half of the population before
the Ustashe massacres of Serbs during World War II.6^
Matica Hrvatska asserted Croats were being denied their
rights in Bosnia and other republics and, therefore, sought
to set up branches in Bosnia and Voyvodina to cater to the
needs of Croats in those areas.

But, viewing this as

cultural imperialism, neither Bosnia or Voyvodina would
permit branches to be set up.6^

The End of the Nationalist Coalition
Ultimately, the nationalist groups gathered around
Matica Hrvatska explicitly demanded complete Croatian
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independence.

Secession became mainstream political

sentiment in Croatia.65

In ethnically heterogeneous

communities, friction between Croats and Serbs was
commonplace, and there were reports that in some communities
residents were "arming themselves in anticipation of a
physical showdown."66
By failing to suppress Matica Hrvatska, the liberal
Croatian party leaders lost their chance to save
themselves.6^

Croatia had threatened the territorial

integrity of two fellow federal units (Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Voyvodina) and alienated a third (Serbia) by their
chauvinist pose towards Serbs in Croatia.

The nationalists

had gone too far and thus the appearance of an antiCroatian coalition was to be expected.

The presence of the

anti-Croatian coalition permitted the effective quashing of
the movement by the federal government in league with the
Croatian conservatives.68
In late October 1971, Vladimir Bakarich, a prominent
Croatian conservative and former president of the LCC,
journeyed to Sarajevo to court Bosnian support.

He hoped to

escalate the intra-Croatia party contest to the federal
level in order to defeat the coalition of Croatian liberals
and nationalists.

Branko Mikulich, a Bosnian Croat and

president of the Bosnian party, was sensitive to the
nationalist propaganda coming from Croatia and receptive to
Bakarich's entreaties.69
intraparty

Affected by the escalation of

conflict, Miko Tripalo made a show of force.

He

remarked,

"The policy we are pursuing in Croatia cannot be

changed.

Our opponents think policy can be changed by

replacing a few leaders.

In order to achieve that,

it would

be necessary to replace thousands of leaders in Croatia.

...

We have taken our fate in our hands and we will keep it in
our hands."70

Within the same time period, Tito was meeting

with army leaders in Bosnia.

Whether he also met with

Bakarich and Mikulich is unclear.

However, he was being

shown "suppressed TV reels of Croatian Communist mass
meetings, with only Croatian flags [missing the communist
red star] and with nationalist and anti-Tito slogans,
shouts, songs and signs."71
Matica Hrvatska and Croatian student leaders knew the
Croatian conservatives had undertaken a concerted effort to
enlist Tito's support in throttling the nationalist-liberal
coalition.72

Therefore,

the Croatian Student's Union, in a

dramatic gambit, organized a massive strike designed to
undermine the conservative move by making it clear
conservatism lacked a popular base.

Some three thousand

students met in Zagreb on November 22, 1971, and unanimously
voted to begin a strike at 9 A.M. the following day.
Ostensibly, they protested existing federal regulations
governing hard currency, banking, commerce, linguistic
policies, and military training.

Since Slovenia and

Voyvodina had backed out of an intrarepublican alliance with
Croatia, the LCC had been courting leaders in Kosovo and
Macedonia.

Thus, it is interesting that representatives of
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the Native Macedonian Student's Club and of the Native Club
of Kosovan Students, who were present at the pre-strike
meeting, firmly supported the Croatian students.7-*

Within a

matter of days, at least 30,000 university student across
Croatia were on strike.7^
Until the autumn of 1971, Tito had hoped it would be
possible to effect a compromise with the forces in power in
Croatia, and to let things develop more or less on their
own.

If the suppressed newsreel footage was not enough, the

student strike helped convince Tito compromise was
impossible.

Liberalization, decentralization, and

appeasement of Croatia had only fed the Croat's ever
increasing hunger for autonomy.

Yugoslav military

intelligence later uncovered evidence some of the party
leaders had been in contact with Croatian Ustashe emigre
groups in West Germany.76
Tito considered sending troop into Croatia, but
eventually he decided to decapitate the Croatian party
leadership.

On December 1, 1971, Tito convened a joint

meeting of the party presidiums of the LCY and the LCC at
Karadjordjevo, Voyvodina.76

At this meeting,

first Session of the LCY presidency,

the Twenty-

it b e c a m e .obvious just

how isolated nationalist-liberal Croats were.

The Serbian

and Croatian conservatives led the assault, supported by
ideological bedfellows from Voyvodina and Montenegro.
Bosnia, Slovenia, and even Kosovo (whose party was at that
time still controlled by the Serbs) criticized Croatia's
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exclusivist nationalism and called for stern measures.

The

Croatian leaders were upbraided for their "unhealthy"
liberalism, nonchalance with respect to counterrevolutionary
groups, and use of student organizations to advance their
political aims.
order.77

The Croats were told to put their house in

But, given the denunciation of the liberals, the

Twenty-first Session could only strengthen the hand of the
conservatives on the Croatian central committee.
Finally, on December 12, 1971, Miko Tripalo and Savka
Dabchevich-Kuchar resigned their posts under pressure.

In

protest of Tripalo's resignation, five hundred student
militants demonstrated four days in downtown Zagreb.

They

demanded the creation of a separate Croatian state, a
response which only served to further implicate the liberals
and strengthen Tito's hand.78

Helmeted riot police were

sent in to occupy strategic points in Zagreb, while
helicopters surveyed the streets from above.
the army was prepared to move in.78

If necessary,

A follow-up conference

to the Twenty-first session declared that "nationalism has
become ... the focal point for everything in our society
that is reactionary, anti-socialist and anti-democratic,
bureaucratic and Stalinist.88
In the aftermath of the crisis, literally tens of
thousands of members were expelled from the party, most for
failure to toe the party line,8^ while Shime Djodan, Marko
Veselica,82 and the editor of Hrvatski tjednik were
sentenced to long prison terms.

Matica Hrvatska was shut
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down and its fourteen publications

were put out of

commission.

at the end of 1973 with a

The backlash climaxed

purge of writers, film-makers, university professors, and
former liberal leaders.88

However, Tito moved to undercut

the popular bases of the Croatian nationalists by granting
many of their economic demands, even though these demands
were secondary to their ethnic and

cultural aspirations.

In

a sense, Belgrade conceded that Croatia had been exploited
and Croatia's contribution to the federal budget had been
proportionally the largest.84
The Croatian crisis can be analyzed as a period in
which the political actors tested the limits of Yugoslavia's
federal system and,
them.

in some cases, attempted to transcend

The processes of alliance building became pronounced,

and alliances existed as tangible understandings and were
consciously pursued.

Thus, when Slovenia and Voyvodina

backed away from the Croatian nexus, Croatia sought new
allies in Kosovo and Macedonia.
However,

interrepublican conflict in Yugoslavia cannot

be characterized one-dimensionally.

The Croatian crisis

suggests that in a multinational state, fundamental
confrontations are likely to be manifested on three levels:
(1) the federal or central level, as a conflict between
republican actors within a federal context;

(2) the

interrepublican level, as an unmediated conflict between the
units themselves; and (3) the intrarepublican level, as a
struggle between factions within the unit and a

66
confrontation between cross-migrated diasporas

(such as the

Croatian Serbs or the Bosnian Croats) and their host
cultures.
^sThe Yugoslav federation had weathered the crisis— but
not without demonstrating the vulnerability of a system
which is founded on the perceived self-interests of various
ethnic groups, and on an ultimate arbiter like Tito.85
Without an emotional attachment to the political aggregate
(Yugoslav patriotism), the Yugoslav multiethnic state seemed
at the time of the Croatian crisis to have become a
collection of jealous, warring competitors in a balance of
power system. /
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CHAPTER IV
NATIONALIST STRIFE:

1970-1987

Croatian nationalism and its political consequences
represented the principal threat to the integrity and
stability of the Yugoslav federation in the late 1960s and
early 1970s.

But by the end of the 1970s, Bosnia-

Herzegovina and Kosovo had become the loci of new
ethnonationalist conflicts.

The Muslim question and the

persistence of separatist sentiment among Yugoslavia's
Albanians are today the primary areas of nationalist
disequilibrium in the Yugoslav system.
The conservative linkage of the Croatian nationalist
movement with the rising middle class (stigmatizing it as
"unproletarian") is thoroughly inapplicable to the situation
in Kosovo.

Nationalist discontent in Kosovo is to an

appreciable degree a product of perceived economic
deprivation.

The "unproletarian" label is also irrelevant

to the situation in Bosnia, where the Islamic community has
figured as the chief advocate of a nationalism which is
divorced from mere religious identity.
Therefore, a discussion and analysis of the Muslim
question and of separatist pressures in Kosovo is useful in
illustrating the depth of ethnic strife in Yugoslavia—
strife which is at times related to the dominant Serb-Croat
rivalry, and at other times completely independent of it.
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Moreover, an examination of Muslim problems and Albanian
nationalism will aid in determining whether Yugoslavia does
indeed resemble a balance of power system.

The Muslim Question
Long before Muslim consciousness became politicized,
the question of Bosnia's status in the federation was
recognized as critical to the stabilization of
interrepublican politics.

If Bosnia had been allowed to

remain part of Croatia, leaving intact the eastern
boundaries set by the World War II Croatian Ustashe state,
the Croatian republic would have been

assured of

overwhelming economic hegemony in the

federation.^ However,

the incorporation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into Serbia was
equally unthinkable to a generation which had languished
under Greater Serbian exploitation and had devoted more than
two decades to the struggle against Serbianization.

It was

also unlikely a division of Bosnia between Croatia and
Serbia could provide a basis for interethnic harmony.^
Therefore, a separate status for Bosnia was necessary to
insure postwar stability in

socialist Yugoslavia.

In the early postwar period, the

Muslims were viewed as

the least "national" of Yugoslavia's peoples,

even as

potentially anational (if they did not identify themselves
as either Serbs or Croats).^

Throughout the postwar era,

antagonistic groups advanced rival theories about the
origins of the Bosnian Muslims.

The Bogomil theory is a
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variant expostulated by Croatian nationalists.

They hold

that certain ethnic Croats embraced a Manichaean religion
known as Bogomilism, were thereafter persecuted by both the
Catholic and Orthodox churches, and converted to Islam when
the comparatively liberal-minded Turks subsequently
conquered the region.^
An alternative theory espoused by Serbs asserts the
Muslims are in fact Serbian settlers who abandoned Orthodoxy
and adopted Islam during the time of the Turkish
occupation.^

Serbian ethnologists also claim some Serbian

immigrants in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
converted to Catholicism, so that many of today's Croats in
Bosnia are Serbs by origin.
Muslim nationalists have advanced a third theory.

They

argue Bosnian Muslims have a Turkish origin and trace their
antecedents to immigration from Anatolia.

This theory

contests the customary belief that the Bogomil sect was a
spin-off from Christianity.

Instead, they contend the

Bogomils were a non-Christian sect whose doctrines were
related to Islam.

According to this theory, the only thing

Slavic about the Bosnian Muslims is their language, which
they absorbed from the indigenous population.®

However,

Tito endorsed all three theories of Muslim ethnogenesis in
an effort to deny exclusive legitimacy to any one theory.^
In February 1968, the central committee of the League
of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina (LCB-H)resolved that
"experience has shown the damage of various forms of

pressure and insistence,

in the earlier period [1940-1968],

that Muslims declare themselves ethnically to be Serbs or
Croats because, as was demonstrated ... and as contemporary
socialist experience continues to show, the Muslims are a
separate nation."

4?hus, the 1971 census was the first in

which "Muslim" was treated as a fully recognized
nationality.8

Inevitably, Bosnian Serbs and Croats felt

threatened by the specter of a new ethnic force./ As a
result, the 1971 census witnessed considerable nationalist
agitation in Bosnia
Croatian Crisis).

(only partially in reaction to the
Some groups pressured citizens to declare

themselves "Muslims, in the ethnic sense," while other
groups pressured the Muslims to declare themselves
"Yugoslavs, ethnically undeclared."9
The Macedonian party was sensitive to emerging Muslim
nationalism because a segment of Macedonian-speaking
citizens are Muslim, although the majority of Macedonians
are Orthodox.

In early 1971, the League of Communists of

Macedonia (LCM) insisted that "Muslims who speak Macedonian
are Macedonian" and that they were, as they viewed
themselves,

"Macedonians of Islamic faith."

"Historically

and scientifically," the secretariat of the central
committee of the LCM maintained,

"it is quite clear that

Muslims of Slavic extraction living in Macedonia, who speak
Macedonian, are nothing other than Macedonians."
Nova Macedonija, the official organ of the Macedonian
party, warned that "the thesis about Muslims of Slavic
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origin in Macedonia, as parts of a nascent Muslim nation,
conceals an immediate threat of the reawakening of an old
hegemonism vis-a-vis Macedonian nationality, history, and
culture."

The LCM adamantly denied Muslims in Macedonia

have any ethnic tie whatsoever with Muslims in Bosnia.

The

party believed there was nothing peculiar about Macedonians
being either Orthodox or Muslim, adding that Albanians
living in Macedonia can be Muslim, Catholic, or Orthodox.1^
Kosovo entered into the fray when the Kosovan party
offered that "Muslim ethnic affiliation cannot be connected
with this or that republic or spoken language, because every
citizen, without regard to where he lives, enjoys the same
freedom of expressing his national or ethnic affiliation,
which cannot be confused with religious affiliation."
Kosovo had repudiated the Macedonian position that Muslims
who speak Macedonian are,

ipso facto, Macedonian, and

allowed for the possibility that a portion of Macedonia's
population might indeed be Muslim— in the ethnic sense.
Most important to the debate, and to the possibility
Yugoslavia was evolving into a system of shifting
interrepublican alliances, is that the position advanced by
each republic was the theory most appropriate to its own
conditions.

Each unit attempted to impose its own theory on

the other units and to seek adherents within other units,
even though any theory was only germane to a particular
republic.

Bosnia wanted religiocultural heritage accepted

as a sufficient basis for national identity.

Macedonia
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preferred to emphasize language and ethnic descent, while
Croatia favored ethnic descent.

Kosovo, with a mixed

population of Albanian, Turkish, and Macedonian Muslims,
plus Orthodox Serbs, Albanians, and Macedonians, and even
some Catholic Albanians, decided to articulate what
superficially appeared to be the most tolerant approach.12
Eventually,

the Serbian party lent oblique support to

the Bosnia-Kosovo coalition when Latinka Perovich, secretary
of the central committee of the LCS, declared it a matter of
LCY policy that all people in Yugoslavia must be free to
determine their own ethnic affiliation.

This vaguely

formulated statement amounted to a reprimand of Macedonia
and Croatia and succeeded in bringing the question of
Macedonian to a temporary c l o s e . ^
The Kosovan-Macedonian quarrel over Muslim nationality
resurfaced in the months preceding the 1981 census.

A noted

Macedonian historian, Niyazi Limanovi, argued the Albanians
of Kosovo were utilizing Islam in a strategy to deMacedonize Macedonia.

Limanovi concluded there were some

50,000 Muslim Macedonians in Macedonia who had previously
reported themselves to be Albanians, Muslims, or even Serbs.
He insisted they should declare themselves to be Macedonian
Muslims in the forthcoming census.
historian,

Ali Hadri, a Kosovan

remonstrated against Limanovi's attempt to pin

the Macedonian label on Muslims in Macedonia and asserted
ethnic identity was a matter of individual determination— a
right guaranteed by the Yugoslav constitution.
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After the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Bosnian
Muslim clergy became increasingly active spokesmen for
Muslim ethnic interests.

They repeatedly sought permission

to establish cultural institutions to stimulate Muslim
national identity.14

More recently, nationally conscious

Muslims have renewed efforts to found autonomous cultural
institutions.

Citing the existence of Matica Hrvatska and

Matica Srpska, Muslim nationalists demanded the
establishment of a Matica Muslimanska and the organization
of Muslim cultural-artistic societies.

But the LCY has

consistently blocked such endeavors, calling them efforts to
obtain a "privileged status" and to establish a power base
from which to pursue a policy of "discrimination against the
other religions."
A new generation of Muslims, educated to think of
Bosnian Muslims as a national group and encouraged by
contacts with the Middle East, has begun to look to Islam as
a basis for political mobilization.15

In April 1983,

Yugoslav authorities uncovered an illegal organization of
Bosnian Muslims described as working for the creation of an
Islamic republic in Yugoslavia and having illegal ties with
"reactionary" Muslims abroad.

Eleven persons, including two

imams, were put on trial and sentenced to prison for terms
averaging more than eight years.16
Some Bosnian Muslim clergy have tried to draw a line
between "positive political activity" and "negative
political activity" on the part of religious organizations,
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and thus claim for the Islamic community a legitimate role
in the political constellation.17

This has often been

combined with a desire to stress religion, which is, after
all, the source of Muslim ethnicity.

But the LCY, which

fears the identification of religion and nationality, wants
to have it both ways— to derive a new nationality from a
religion but yet to deny that derivation and suppress
demands based on it.
The rising tide of Muslim nationalism in Yugoslavia
probably owes more to indigenous factors than to any
external e f f e c t s . T h e

era of the Croatian Crisis was an

important catalyst for Muslim nationalism,

insofar as

Croatian calls for the annexation of all or part of Bosnia
provided the sort of cultural threat which quickly inflames
ethnic sensitivities.

However, Muslim nationalism in

Yugoslavia did predate the worldwide Islamic revival by
several years.19
It is somewhat ironic that Tito, in one of his last
public addresses (November 25, 1979), claimed "the nations
of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be proud of their successes

...

because they have succeeded in outgrowing mutual conflicts
and frictions among nationalities." The famous YugoslavMontenegrin dissident, Milovan Djilas, chided "the problem
has been solved— but not definitively.

From a functional

point of view, it can be argued the Bosnian Muslims are a
balance of power mechanism which serves to keep the Croats
and Serbs from destroying each other.

This seems to be the
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view of the LCY, even if it does fear the growth of rampant
Muslim nationalism.

The crux of the Muslim question is that

the nationalist fever in Bosnia continues to spread among a
group which constitutes only 40 percent of the republic,
though elements in the remaining 60 percent continue to have
serious doubts about the validity of the Muslim claim to
nationality.

Albanian Nationalism in Kosovo
Albanian nationalism is a problem for Yugoslav
interrepublican relations for at least five reasons:

(1) it

directly affects Kosovo's relations with Serbia, Macedonia,
and Montenegro (since Kosovo was long dominated by Serbs,
and since there are also many Albanians in Macedonia and
Montenegro);

(2) Albanian agitation for republican status

for Kosovo has an impact on the interrepublican balance of
power

(Kosovo is the central force for the upgrading of

Yugoslavia's autonomous provinces);

(3) the nationalism of

one ethnic group has an incendiary effect on the others;

(4)

the threat of secession is not merely a matter of concern to
the federation as a whole but also to its several parts; and
(5) Kosovo represents ultimate test of the validity of
Yugoslav nationalities policy and, in particular, of the
Marxist premise that economic equality causes nationalist
tempers to abate.
Nearly one-half of the world's Albanians live in
Yugoslavia.

Most of Yugoslavia’s Albanians live in Kosovo

(about 1.2 million), with the remainder in Macedonia
(350,000) and Montenegro

(50,000).21

There is also an

important pocket of Albanians in Belgrade.

During World War

II, the Kosovo region was attached to Italian-dominated
Albania.

For several years after the war officially ended,

Albanian guerrilla groups held out in Kosovo, desperately
resisting reincorporation into Yugoslavia.22

In the winter

of 1956, the Yugoslav secret police attempted to confiscate
the weapons of Kosovo's Albanians.

This project provoked

resistance and resulted -in the deaths of a number of
Albanians before an estimated nine thousand firearms were
confiscated.

However, the deterioration in Kosovo's

political equilibrium is normally traced to 1966, when
revelations of Serbian dominance of the governmental, party,
and security apparatus in Kosovo inflamed resentment among
the Kosovan Albanians.22
After reviewing conditions in Kosovo, the Fourth Plenum
(1966) of the central committee of the LCY warned of Greater
Serbian tendencies within the ranks of the LCY.

The

consensus was that Greater Serbian nationalism was an
unnecessary stimulus to existing Albanian separatism and had
to be expunged.

Albanian separatism was identified as a

problem at this time, even though Kosovo had not yet been
shaken by ethnic riots.2^

These developments sent Serbian

conservatives and nationalists into a rage.

They castigated

Albanian nationalism and irredentism in Kosovo, and lamented
that Serbs had become the victims of systematic reverse
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discrimination insofar as employment in Kosovo was
concerned.

Yet, despite the resistance of Serbophile

conservatives, Serbian domination of Albania was waning.2^
The LCY agreed in the spring of 1968 to substitute the
neutral term "Albanian" for the term "Shiptar," which the
Albanians considered pejorative*0 but which had been the
standard vocabulary in official as well as unofficial
business.27

In early November 1968, the LCS proposed that

the designations of the party organizations of the
autonomous provinces be changed.

Shortly thereafter,

the

"LCS for Voyvodina" became the League of Communists of
Voyvodina

(LCV), and the "LCS for Kosovo" became the League

of Communists of Kosovo-Metohija

(LCK).

In mid-November

1968, the Sixth Congress of the LCS authorized the
provincial party organizations to pass their own statutes.
The Albanian component was immediately strengthened in the
Kosovan party.

However, Albanians and Hungarians were still

significantly underrepresented in the respective party
organizations of Kosovo and Voyvodina.2®
Despite the attempts by the LCS to mollify Albanian
resentment, Kosovo exploded in violence on November 27,
1968.

Hundreds of demonstrators smashed shop windows and

overturned cars in Prishtina (Kosovo's capital), and the
anti-Serbian protest quickly spread to other towns in
Kosovo.

Some of the rioters demanded annexation by Albania,

and crowds could be heard chanting "Long Live Enver Hoxha!"
(the ruler of Communist Albania).

The protestors drew up a
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list of demands which included dropping "Metohija"

(a

Serbian word, although "Kosovo" is also a Serbian word but
part of the Albanian language) from the official name of the
region.

They demanded the redesignation of Kosovo as a

republic, the extension of the right of self-determination
to Kosovo (the right of a republic, not of an autonomous
province), and the establishment of an independent
university in P r i s h t i n a . ^
In early December 1968, the disturbances spread to some
Macedonian cities, and the LCY responded swiftly and
decisively.

The ring leaders of the apparently well-

organized demonstrations received jail terms of up to five
years, and those held chiefly accountable for unrest in
Macedonia received sentences of up to seven years.

By mid-

February 1969, thirty-seven LCY member had been expelled
from the party for participation or in support of the
demonstrations.30
The federal government was not prepared to indulge in
the partition of Serbia, but some concessions had to be
given to the Albanians.

The demand for republican status

was flatly turned town.

However, both Kosovo and Voyvodina

were granted some of the prerogatives of republics and the
modifier "socialist" was appended to their official
designations (hence, the Socialist Autonomous Province of
Kosovo).3*

Kosovo-Metohija was renamed Kosovo, and the

Kosovars were also given permission to fly the Albanian flag
alongside the Yugoslav.

Flying their national flag was

something Tito did not allow the Croats, but in the case of
Kosovo, Tito felt the threat of separatism was not as
imminent as the possible rebirth of Greater Serbian hegemony
over Yugoslavia.33

Belgrade took steps to improve the

economic situation in Kosovo, and to promote more Albanians
to positions of authority.

Finally,

there followed the

creation of an independent University of Prishtina in 1969,
and the rapid Albanianization of both faculty and student
body in what had been a branch of the University of
Belgrade.33

Eventually,

the introduction of an irredentist

intelligentsia from the University of Tirana in Albania
would prove to have dire consequences for interethnic
relations in Kosovo.3^
For the Serbs, the demographic threat in Kosovo is
particularly poignant because the region contains many
shrines of the medieval Serbian kingdom of Tsar Dushan.35
Most importantly,

it was at Kosovo "Polje" (the Field of the

Blackbirds) where the Serbian army was crushed by the Turks
in 1389, and the battlefield had retained great patriotic
pride for Serbs in the same way the defeat at the Alamo
inspired Texans.36
However, Kosovo is now overwhelmingly inhabited by
Albanians, who have by far the highest birthrate of all of
Yugoslavia's peoples.37

Moreover, as a result of the

turmoil, Albanian and Serbian neighbors became openly
hostile and Prishtina university polarized along ethnic
lines.

Serbs and Montenegrins were often attacked on the
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streets, had their farms and crops destroyed, and many
Orthodox churches and shrines were reduced to rubble by the
predominantly Muslim Albanians.

Consequently,

thousands of

Serbs and Montenegrins streamed out of Kosovo, most of them
professionals and specialists with higher education.

Even

the dead were not immune to the ethnic hatred, as Albanians
broke up Serbian and Montenegrin gravestones and unearthed
graves in K o s o v o . R e l a t i o n s

between Albanians and

Macedonians also remained tense as separatist Albanians in
Macedonia were systematically suppressed and a r r e s t e d . ^
The problems with Albanian nationalism exhibited some
of the same characteristics which marked the Croatian
crisis.

First, there were instances of anomic and

collective violence manifested in the demonstrations of
1968, the mutual incitement of the two national groups, and
the Serbian exodus itself (although the exodus of Croatian
Serbs was rather minimal compared to the number of Serbs
fleeing Koso vo ).

Second, there were repeated instances

providing evidence that members of the local nationality
were prepared to organize in defense of their aspirations.
For example, four Kosovan Albanians were imprisoned for
plotting the secession of Kosovo and its attachment to
Albania.^®

Third, conflict in Kosovo, as in Croatia, was

transmuted to the elite level.

Thus, at the Twenty-ninth

Plenum of the LCK in June 1971, Serbs and Montenegrins
exchanged broadsides with Albanian delegates over questions
of rights for the Serbian minority in Kosovo and alleged
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separatist plots.41

Finally,

the Kosovo outbreak in 1968

exemplifies conflict accommodation as practiced in communist
Yugoslavia— jail the troublemakers but grant their nondisintegrative demands.

The Kosovo Crisis
Interethnic tensions remained high in Kosovo during the
1970s.

The heavily Albanianized security forces enjoyed

only a brief respite between 1969 and 1973.

In 1973

Albanian separatists launched their first large-scale
propaganda offensive since the demonstrations of November
1968.

Yugoslav security forces discovered evidence of an

underground separatist organization known as the
Revolutionary Movement of United Albania, but the security
forces were unable to uproot it.

This group, together with

the so-called Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Albanians
of Yugoslavia, which may have enjoyed Albania's support,
undertook what the federal government labeled "serious
propaganda actions" in 1973-1975.42

The group called for

the secession of Kosovo and those parts of Macedonia and
Montenegro inhabited by Albanians. The crux of the
secessionist plan was to form a Greater Albania which would
be specifically anti-Serbian in nature.

This "Marxist-

Leninist" party was apparently uncovered by Yugoslav
security organs in early 1975.42
Another underground group, dubbed the National
Liberation Movement of Kosovo, was discovered during the
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summer of 1975.

Two of its leading members, both students

at the University of Prishtina and heavily influenced by
Albanian faculty members, were given lengthy prison
sentences.

Five more student groups were discovered between

1979 and 1980.

Security organs turned up still another such

organization early in 1981, which, according to Yugoslavia's
minister of the interior, had been operating in conjunction
with the pro-Albanian "Red Front" o r g a n i z a t i o n . ^
In addition to organized and semi-organized activity,
sporadic violence repeatedly broke out in Kosovo during the
1970s, and organized Albanian separatism was spreading to
Macedonia.

Between 1978 and 1981, Yugoslav security organs

uncovered and suppressed two illegal Albanian separatist
organizations operating in Macedonia.

However,

situation was complicated by another factor.

the

The

increasingly Albanian-dominated provincial leadership in
Kosovo was loathe to allow Serbian involvement in anti
separatist efforts, partly because of a natural ethnic
empathy for Albanians and party because of a fear the
problems might incite the leadership of the Serbian republic
to retract some of the political powers the LCK had
acquired.
Thus, the provincial leadership engaged in a massive
cover-up, the scale of which was only appreciated after the
province exploded in violence in the spring of 1 9 8 1 . ^
Certainly the LCY was well aware that trouble was brewing in
Kosovo.

The arrests of several hundred Albanian

nationalists in 1979, on charges of distributing subversive
material, and a telltale eruption of ethnic turmoil in
Kosovo in May 1980 were powerful reminders the festering
discontent retained political significance.

But Belgrade

had only sketchy information about the Albanian separatist
movement;

the Kosovan ministry of the interior, which was

well informed about the strength and escapades of a least
some of the underground organizations, was withholding its
intelligence.46
The information problem involved not merely the SerbiaKosovo relationship but, in fact, was also an internal
problem for Kosovo.

District committees in the province

were routinely withholding information from the provincial
committee.

In addition, the growing tendency to publish

internal information in Albanian alone tended to leave local
Serbs ignorant of important aspects of basic issues.47
Despite the evident latent instability in Kosovo,

few

observers were prepared for the virulence of the nationalist
and ethnically inspired riots which shook the province in
March and April of 1981.

When Albanian students at the

University of Prishtina went on a rampage on March 11,
officials denied any ethnic link, and claimed the riot was
sparked by dissatisfaction with bad cooking in the
university cafeteria.

Although some two thousand student

were involved, the first wave of riots attracted little
attention.46
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Subsequently, on April 1, violent riots broke out at
the University of Prishtina (whose full-time student body
numbered 37,000 at the time).

Beginning with marauding

protestors who smashed factory equipment and shop windows
and set trucks on fire, tensions quickly escalated into open
street battles,

Some rioters even used kindergarten-aged

children as shields against police.

Most of the children

were girls not in school because of the parochial proclivity
of Albanian families to keep their female children from
attending school.

Miners from the nearby coal mine and

workers from the electric power station in a neighboring
town joined the students as the disorder spread to the
general area around Prishtina.

By April 3, the riot had

spread, and hardly any municipality in Kosovo abstained from
the v i o l e n c e . ^

Many of the demonstrators, between ten and

twenty thousand, were armed.

In the ensuing clashes with

the riot police, perhaps as many as 2,600 persons were
killed, many by firearms.50
The revolutionary overtones of the Albanian riots were
unmistakable.

Rioters demanded either republican status for

Kosovo or outright secession.51

In the official viewpoint,

these demands amounted to the same thing.

The Yugoslav

regime rushed in tanks and armored personnel carriers,
imposed a curfew throughout the province, cut off telephone
connections with the rest of Yugoslavia, and established
control points on all roads into Prishtina.

Commandos and

soldiers armed with machine guns moved in to patrol the
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streets, and helicopters hovered overhead.52

Some two dozen

ringleaders were jailed immediately, and a state of
emergency was declared.

On April 5, Prishtina's factories

were reopened, though a ban on public meetings remained in
eff ec t.
But pacification failed, as local Albanians continued
to scrawl anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav graffiti on public
walls, to distribute insurrectionary pamphlets, and to
disrupt instruction in public schools.

Trains were

derailed, and the power station at Kosovo Polje and numerous
other installations and buildings suffered varying degrees
of damage in a rash of unexplained fires.53

Eventually,

the

schools, closed once and reopened two weeks later, were
closed for a second time, and the school year was declared
over.54

The Belgrade media openly asked why the University

of Prishtina had been encouraged to grow so large, when it
was inconceivable its graduates could find jobs commensurate
with their training and ambitions, and when most of the
students were only fluent in Albanian and not SerboCroatian. 55
By the end of May 1981, unrest had spread to Montenegro
and Macedonia, although Albanian activity was generally
restricted to the distribution of insurrectionary and
irredentist literature, writing revolutionary slogans in
public places, and engaging in various acts of desecration.
Even Serbia had problems, with Albanian nationalists
stirring up trouble in communes throughout Southern Serbia.
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Albanians also created disorder in Zagreb, while in the
Slovenian capital of Ljubljana police were able to abort a
demonstration of Albanians only at the last minute.^8
Arson, terrorism,

sabotage, and pamphleteering became a

way of life in Kosovo.

There were some 680 fires attributed

to arson during 1980 and 1981.

Violent student

demonstrations continued to break out thorough 1982.
Hundreds of students clashed with security police in
February and March 1982 riots, leaving numerous injured.
Three bombs were set off in downtown Prishtina between
October and November 1982, the third exploding in the
vicinity of the headquarters of the L C K .

As 1982 drew to a

close, the situation had deteriorated into an uneasy state
of martial law, with the authorities unable to guarantee
public safety or the security of p r op er ty . ^
A state of siege prevailed in Kosovo, as 30,000 troops
and police (most of them from Croatia and Slovenia)
patrolled the province as an occupation force.

All incoming

and outgoing traffic was scrupulously checked, and the
movement of outsiders into the province was largely
proscribed.58

Belgrade hastened to ban textbooks imported

from Albania, which were discovered to have insurrectionary
overtones, and undertook to translate the more "reliable"
Serbian textbooks into Albanian for the use of the
Kosovars.
The ranks of the party were also infected by
nationalism, and by July 1982 some 1,000 LCK members were

expelled from the party (including the Albanian provincial
party chief).

Some of the expelled party members were also

guilty of being participants in the riots.

Several basic

organizations of the LCK were simply dissolved outright.

By

i

May 1983, more than 1,100 Albanians had been imprisoned for
anti-Yugoslav activity, often with fifteen-year sentences.
The LCY central committee purged the Kosovan party of six of
the nineteen members of the provincial presidium.®®

In

addition, editors of the radio and television station in
Prishtina were fired, as were more than two hundred faculty
members at the University of Prishtina.®1
Party spokesmen also began to express misgivings about
the radical devolution of authority to the autonomous
provinces, arguing the provinces should coordinate their
policies more closely with the Serbian republic.®^

But

members of the Voyvodinan party vented strong opposition to
suggestions the prerogatives of the autonomous provinces be
curtailed.®'*
The 1981 Kosovo riots were a rude awakening as they
signified the repudiation of more than ten years of intense
efforts to accelerate development in this backward region.
They demonstrated the primacy of the ethnic community.®^
The rioters and all who sympathized with them showed a
preference to live under Albanian despotism rather than to
remain part of Yugoslavia, however more relatively open the
latter might be.®®

CLearly,

it was this separatist and

irredentist dimension, as well as the possible impact the
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outbreak might have on other discontented nationalities,
which troubled Belgrade most.
The incipient revolt in Kosovo had driven additional
Kosovan Montenegrins and Serbs out of Kosovo, precipitated a
nationalist backlash among Macedonians and Serbs, and
sparked the proliferation of nationalist excesses throughout
the other seven federal units.66

Some 10,000 Serbs and

Montenegrins left Kosovo between April and the end of
October 1981.

Most of them fled to Serbia, often to

Belgrade, bearing tales of Albanian atrocities which
reminded many of the Croatian Ustashe in World War II.
The Kosovo Crisis sent tremors through the Tito-less
LCY hierarchy.

At first the regime awkwardly tried to play

down the riots and attempted to persuade the public the
riots amounted to no more than the work of traitors, whose
actions were "unanimously condemned" even by the local
Albanians.

This transparent facade could not be maintained

for long and the admission of the scale of violence led to
immediate criticism of the entire LCY policy towards
Kosovo.67

However, aside from purging Kosovan officials who

had compromised themselves., the LCY had no new ideas to
bring to bear.

If a policy is considered to be a failure,

it would appear the regime can only fall back on naked
force.

In fact, Yugoslav police organs have attempted to

exploit the crisis in order to push through certain
repressive measures and tighten the political screws.

The prolonged disquiet in Kosovo disproves the Yugoslav
claim that a unique formula for interethnic harmony has been
found.

The crisis also worked against party liberals.

Insofar as the central party leadership had discovered that
the directives issued to the Kosovan party were not being
carried out, the conclusion can be readily drawn that the
party was in revolt, and the devolution favored by liberals
as a means of ethnic appeasement can be turned around and
exploited as a tool of r e b e l l i o n . T h u s ,

the Kosovo Crisis

has thrown the whole Yugoslav system off balance.

It has

also dramatically strengthened the position of those in the
LCY who fear devolution and decentralization have gone too
far and favor a more literal application of the principle of
democratic centralism.
The Kosovo Crisis also constitutes an indictment of
Yugoslav-Marxism itself.

The LCY has continued to operate

on the Marxist-Leninist premise that nationalism under
socialism is merely an epiphenomenon of economic
inequalities; and it has, therefore, been pumping large
amounts of credits into Kosovo.

Yet, despite incontestable

economic gains in absolute terms, Kosovo has steadily
slipped further behind relative to the other federal
units.In

the case of Kosovo, the policy of economic

leveling has been a failure in a much more critical sense.
Since Albanian nationalism is obviously more than
politicized resentment at economic inequality,
policies are misguided.

the LCY's
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It could be argued that prompt concession of the
nationalist's minimum demand— creation of an Albanian
socialist republic within the Yugoslav federation,

to

include not only all of Kosovo but also areas of Montenegro
and Macedonia inhabited by Albanians— could avert further
turmoil and defuse backing for the maximum demand.70

Of

course, the maximum demand constitutes secession of Kosovo
and those parts of the two neighboring republics and their
annexation to Albania.

However,

the sheer violence and

depth of ethnocentrism spreading throughout Kosovo suggests
it is too late to consider the minimum demands.
Recently,

the few Serbs and Montenegrins left in Kosovo

have started to become more demonstrative in their protests
against the Albanian majority.

On April 24, 1987, police

briefly clashed with about 10,000 people and used truncheons
to control a crowd.

The incident occurred when thousands of

Serbs and Montenegrins gathered outside the Hall of Culture
in Kosovo P o l j e .

Slobodan Milosevich, the head of the LCS,

was listening to complaints about alleged harassment of
minorities by Albanians.

About 300 delegates from the crowd

were admitted to the hall to talk to Milosevich.

The clash

began when the police (comprised primarily of Kosovan
Albanians)71 tried to disperse the crowd away from the
hall.72
Although Albanian, Croatian, and Muslim nationalism
have all proved destabilizing to the Yugoslav system,
Albanian nationalism differs in one fundamental respect from

the Croatian and Muslim examples.

Kosovo lies astride an

independent Albania which, despite its despotic
backwardness, exerts an undiminished attraction for Kosovo's
Albanians.73

Enver H o x h a 's demise has failed to reduce the

level of irredentist sentiment.7 ^
than any other,

For this reason, more

the question of Albanian nationalism remains

today the most trying and most intractable problem on
Belgrade's agenda.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Tito's actions which ended the Croatian crisis and
swept the liberals out of office affected interrepublican
relations in an important way.

Tito refused to scuttle the

liberal reforms; yet he did not trust the liberals to
administer them.

He let the conservative factions carry out

the liberal's vision, thus confirming the quasi-confederal
nature of the system, without allowing autonomous centers of
power to become foci of politicized collective activity.
Ultimately, Tito hoped to hold together a "liberal" system
not by force but by a common ideology, the ideology of
"conservatism."

In the wake of Tito's death, the LCY, shorn

of the arbiter who had kept rival factions in check, proved
unable to agree on a common policy.

The LCY's control

slackened as ethnonationalism inspired republican parties to
take advantage of growing confederalism.
Yet it is a testament to their political savvy that
Yugoslav policy-makers did not permit the Croatian crises to
deflect them from what was the only route which might
conceivably lead to real stability— that of devolution and
decentralization.1

Nationalism is both an integrative and

disintegrative force, and only a polycentric structure is
apt to have any chance of long term success in a multiethnic
system.
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Therefore,

the Yugoslavs are quite justified in

claiming they have created a federalism which is virtually
unique in form.

Possibly the most distinctive aspect of

Yugoslav federalism is the principle of unanimity in
decision-making in party and governmental organs.

Since

1970, no decision at the federal level has been taken until
all the federal units acquiesce.

Other elements of style

include the practices of inter republican mutual
consultation, the pooling of information,

the principle of

proportionality, and the reliance on compromises and
reciprocal concessions.2
The Yugoslavs make a further claim.

They argue that if

they have not solved the problems attendant to a multiethnic
polity, at least they have set the ship of state on course
by virtue of their radical federalism and a profound
ideological reexamination characterized by original thought
and innovative r e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . W h e n confronted by
manifestations of ethnocentrism and ethnic hatred in
Yugoslavia,

regime apologists brush aside these criticisms

with the observation that the Yugoslav system has resolved
the national question in essence and form.

Thus, Marxism

beats a hasty retreat from the world of real politics and
material conflict to the ethereal,
essences and forms.

idealist realm of

But the mood at the Twelfth Party

Congress in June 1982 was sober and "realistic."

This

atmosphere prevailed because of the widespread "suspicion"
throughout the LCY that federalism is irrelevant to the
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Kosovo problem,

that federalism (or even devolution to

confederalism) cannot solve the "national question," and
perhaps the Yugoslav national question is ultimately
"insoluble.
Therefore,

this study illustrates what Marxists did not

anticipate, but what the Yugoslavs have discovered.
Decentralization and devolution in a Marxist-Leninist
multinational state is inevitable if there is no
ethnonational group which wields a majority of power.

Even

more unanticipated, under conditions prevailing in
Yugoslavia today, The Union of South Slavs has developed
into a structure which resembles an international balance of
power system.

Yugoslavia: A Balance of Power System?
Interrepublican relations in contemporary Yugoslavia
are characterized by flexible coalitions which are primarily
motivated by ethnonational concerns.

The political behavior

of these federal units closely approximates the behavior of
states in an international balance of power system.
domestic,

In a

just as in an international balance of power

system, one cannot expect component actors to be moved by
exhortations to the good of the community.

Each group will

attempt to pursue its interests by subordinating the common
good to its own communal interests and also by subordinating
the good of other communal groups to the good of the whole.
However, an element of restraint is built into such a
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system;

the overall survival of the system serves the

interest of each actor

(except, perhaps,

in the case of

Kosovo).5
A requirement for the stability of the system is that
no single actor

(Serbia in the interwar period and up to the

time of the Croatian Crisis)

is indispensible to the

formation of a winning coalition, and cannot therefore
impose its will on the decision-making process.
condition prevails in Yugoslavia today.

Such a

Thus, policy

outcomes in matters of interrepublican importance have come
to depend on the free combination of republican actors in
shifting alliances and flexible coalitions.
It is possible that most common historical p a t t e r n , .
both among and within states, is the loose bipolar system.
This system generally presumes two permanently hostile core
powers, around which lesser powers cluster in a non-random
fashion which approximates equal distribution of allies.
Within a multi-national state, this configuration results if
ethnic groups are polarized on salient and durable issues,
and if these groups divide into two fairly stable camps; or,
in a state constituted by a number of regional ethnic units,
if two predominant units command the allegiance of various
smaller units.

The critical axes along which an ethnically

diverse state may polarize include religion, alphabet, and
language.
Therefore, when a society is riddled with reinforced
cleavages

(as in Yugoslavia, where the prosperous, Catholic,
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ex-Habsburg, Latin-alphabet, industrialized north vies with
the underdeveloped, Orthodox and Muslim, ex-Ottoman,
Cyrillic-alphabet south) and when one actor

(Serbia in the

interwar period) attempts to spread its language and culture
to the rest of the society, a bipolar configuration is a
natural result.
According to Morton Kaplan, the bipolar system is
characterized by polarization, with most significant actors
adhering to one of the two blocs and a universal actor
presiding over the inevitable conflicts of interest.

He

argues that neither bloc can permit its rival to achieve
preponderant strength; that each bloc seeks to further its
own interests first, but will support the universal actor
(the central government) when such support will help to
weaken or constrain the rival; and that the universal actor
will seek, through mediation and whatever coercive
capability it possesses,

to resolve or dampen interbloc

conflicts and to assuage differences between the blocs.6

If

unchecked, Kaplan asserts the universal actor will strive to
impose a directive, monolithic unity on the system.
Kaplan's bipolar description was meant to elucidate the
processes of the Cold War system, with the United Nations in
the role of the universal actor.
in no way presumes, a priori,
actor.

However, bipolar politics

the presence of a universal

Yet, at the same time, Kaplan intended his model to

have a degree of universality which would transcend mere
description of U.S.-Soviet competition.

The LCY,

107
headquartered in Belgrade,

functions as a kind of universal

actor within the Yugoslav system.

But, unlike the U.N.,

which can always be paralyzed by veto, the central party of
Yugoslavia has retained considerable powers, even during the
devolutionary days of the Croatian crisis.
Between 1918 and 1941, and again from 1945 to 1965,
Yugoslavia functioned as a loose bipolar system.

Interwar

Yugoslav politics was monopolized by the Serbs and Croats.
Their electoral aspirations were championed,

respectively,

by the Serbian Radical party, under Nikola Pasich, and the
Croatian Peasant party (CPP), led by Stjepan Radich.

The

government, though not a Serbian creation, was dominated by
the Serbs, who staffed the new government with the leaders
of the old Serbian pre-World War I kingdom.

The Serbs

denied the national identity of the Macedonians and
Montenegrins, viewed Croats and Slovenes as no more than
regional "tribes" of the Serbian nation, and attempted to
run the state on a unitary basis.^
As early as 1919, Radich supported Croatian secession.
The Croatian question lay at the heart of the constitutional
debate, and Croatian politicians exerted pressure in
Belgrade to make some accommodations.®

Toward the end of

1924, pressured by the CPP, Nikola Pasich, the Serbian prime
minister, briefly entertained the possibility of cutting off
Croatia and permitting the CPP to establish an independent
republic there.

However, the imposition of royal

dictatorship in 1929 (along with the flight to Italy by Ante
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Pavelich and a group of militant Croats organized into the
fascist Ustashe party) was symptomatic of the increasing
bifurcation of Yugoslav politics into centralists
and decentralists

(Croats).^

(Serbs)

Tragically, by 1934 even

Yugoslavia's King Alexander was convinced of the
untenability of the political status quo, and may have been
planning to divide Yugoslavia into a Serbian unit and a
Croatian unit when an Ustashe assassin cut him down.1®
In the immediate postwar period, after the
reconstitution of a unified Yugoslavia under Marshal Tito,
the state authorities revived the centralist solution and
resumed the attempt to forge a Yugoslav identity, albeit one
which was meant to transcend mere Serbian ethnic identity.11
Belgrade aspired to "reduce the incompatibility between
blocs."1 '*

As a result, by the 1960s the picture had become

quite different from what it had been in the interwar years.
Previously unacknowledged groups such as Macedonians,
Bosnians, and the Albanians of Kosovo were granted de jure
recognition and, with it, some institutional instruments for
ethnic interest articulation.
the system remained bipolar.

Yet despite these changes,
Croatia and Serbia remained

the major actors in the system until the advent of the
Croatian Crisis, which brought balance of power interethnic
politics to Yugoslavia.
The fundamental principle of balance of power politics
is that no single actor has sufficient power to dictate
terms unilaterally to the other actors.

In Kaplan's version
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of the balance of power system,

there is no universal or

supranational actor capable of marshaling authoritative
legitimacy (the U.N. does so only occasionally),1^ winning
elite consensus

(as did Metternich's Concert of Europe),14

or effectively utilizing armed force (the U.N.

in Korea).

Any national actor which strives to transform itself into a
supranational actor by attempting to launch an incipient
world state (Napoleon I) is opposed by those capable of
resistance.16

In addition, Hans J. Morgenthau argues that

the balance of power model can also be divided into two main
patterns, a pattern of direct opposition between actors
(Serbia and Croatia) and one of competition (Slovenia and
Croatia) among them.16
Therefore, Yugoslavia's road to balance of power
politics lay in the rise of political consciousness in
federal units other than Serbia and Croatia, and in the
massive devolution of power to the republics during the late
1960s.

This devolution enabled republics other than Serbia

and Croatia to wield autonomous power in the political
arena.
The following discussion, which recapitulates the
fluidity of interrepublican alliances during the Croatian
Crisis, should serve to illustrate balance of power behavior
in Yugoslav politics.

During the Croatian Crisis, Croat

leaders concentrated on decentralization of the party.
Backed by the Slovenes and the Macedonians,
momentum on their side.

the Croats kept

The Ninth Party Congress registered
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the victory of the Croatian-led nationalist-liberal
coalition by devolving appreciable power to the republican
parties.

The nationalist-liberal coalition was based on

premises of common interest and mutual trust.

These

evaporated after 1969, as the Croatian party (along with
pressure from Matica H r v at s ka ) went beyond the desires of
its coalition partners.17

Having lent Croatia support

against Serbia in previous confrontations, Voyvodina,
Slovenia, and Macedonia backed away from an alliance with
Croatia.

However, Miko Tripalo and Savka Dabchevich-Kuchar

allowed their supporters to push them further to the
political right toward ever more radical, nationalist
positions.

Tripalo and Dabchevich-Kuchar were unable to

dissociate themselves from their more radical followers, who
demanded Croatia's secession and even aggrandizement of
Croatian territory at the expense of other republics.
Defusing the Croatian Crisis entailed the removal of Tripalo
and Dabchevich-Kuchar and the bridling of Croatia's radical
students.
In conclusion, the balance of power model predicts that
an actor who goes too far and whose ambitions threaten the
territorial integrity of the other members of the system
will be isolated and brought to heel.
of 1971 confirms this principle.

The Croatian Crisis

Moreover, in this crisis,

as in LCY debate over the Muslim question and the Kosovo
Crisis, the federal units displayed autonomy,
and the power to affect federal policy.

flexibility,

Therefore,

Ill
analyzing Yugoslavia as a balance of power system is a
useful, and perhaps necessary, conceptual construct for
interpreting Yugoslav politics since 1965.
However,

it must be conceded that Yugoslavia is a

unique laboratory for observing political behavior in a
Marxist-Leninist multinational state, one which does not
contain a majority ethnic group within the population.
Perhaps, the thesis of this study will be thoroughly tested
when the Soviet Union experiences what is evidently an
inevitable demographic shift, one which is inexorably
eroding the dominance of the Greater Russian majority in the
Soviet political system.
The U.S.S.R.'s dilemma can be anticipated in Soviet
Central Asia.

In December 1986, several hundred students in

Alma Ata, capital of the Soviet republic of Kazakhstan,
demonstrated violently after a Russian replaced an ethnic
Kazak as the republic's party leader.

The situation was

serious enough to warrant the use of Soviet troops to keep
order.1®

The analogy to Kosovo is rather obvious.

The

populations of the Soviet Union's Asian republics are
predominantly Muslim, and their population growth far
outstrips that of the Greater Russians.

Thus, it is

conceivably only a matter of time before the U.S.S.R. has to
confront a situation which is not too dissimilar from the
quandary the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia encountered and
the LCY now faces.1®
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Perspectives
To present Yugoslavia as a balance of power system is
neither to deny the reality of the deterioration of
interethnic relations in the mid-1960s nor to assume the
antipathy which has characterized interethnic relations is a
permanent feature of the system.

However,

it is not merely

because of Yugoslavia's ethnic divisions that the federal
system operates as a balance of power system.

Yet, it is

undeniable that ethnicity and nationalism are the primary
factors which influence the choice of alliance partners and
the endurance of coalitions.
Milovan Djilas wrote that,

"by 2024 Yugoslavia will

become a confederation of four states: Slovenia, Croatia,
Macedonia, and Serbia, with Serbia itself being a federative
state.Djilas'

four emergent states were all expected to

evolve from the present socialist republics.

But there is

not only an institutional prediction to his prognostica
tions, there is also an ethnic dimension.

Djilas predicted

both Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina would disappear as
autonomous territories— the former because of the close
ethnic affinity between Serbs and Montenegrins, and the
latter, perhaps, because Muslim self-consciousness is
neither so developed nor so tenacious as Serbian, Croatian,
or Slovene nationalism.
However, neither in interstate politics nor in the
study of multinational states can external actors be
ignored.

The Soviet Union, as Yugoslavia is fully aware,
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would welcome an opportunity to establish a hegemonic hold
over Yugoslavia.

Belgrade continues to fear the Kremlin

might, under certain circumstances, allow its proxy,
Bulgaria, to annex all or part of Macedonia.21
Therefore, Yugoslavia's overall rating for political
performance would have to be considered a solid medium.
This is considerably less that its apologists would have the
world believe, but it is commendable in a country with four
major languages and large differences in levels of
development.

Whether Yugoslavia will improve as a system

depends chiefly on two factors:

its ability to transform

itself into a fully legitimate regime (which might require
the abandonment of the one-party system)22 and the federal
government's ability to recruit in Tito's words,
the republics who are not republicans."22
suggests a need for system transformation.

"men from

Tito's appeal
But Yugoslavia's

present political configuration may not be capable of
achieving more than a medium rating for political
performance.2^

It is thus conceivable that the Yugoslav,

system has reached the limit of its potential for conflict
t.

accommodation.

"Someday,", writes Milovan Djilas,

"the lid

may blow off."22
Perhaps the noted Marxist philosopher, Tom Nairn, best
characterized Marxism's deficiencies when challenged by the
Hegelian, non-material, and semimystic elements of modern
nationalism:
The theory of nationalism represents Marxism's
great historical failure.
It may have had others

as well ... Marxism's shortcomings over
imperialism, the State, the falling rate of profit
and the immiseration of the masses are certainly
old battlefields.
Yet none of these is as
important, as fundamental, as the problem of
nationalism, either in theory or in political
practice.
It is true that other traditions of
western thought have not done better.
Idealism,
German historicism, liberalism, social Darwinism
and modern sociology have foundered as badly as
Marxism here.
This is cool comfort for Marxists.
The scientific pretensions and the political
significance of their ideas are greater than those
of such rivals, and no one can help feeling that,
they ought to have coped better with such a
central, inescapable phenomenon of modern
h i s t o r y .26
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